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ABSTRACT
We provide an empirical study of bundling in a supply chain, referred to as fullline forcing. We use
an extensive dataset on contracts between video retailers and movie distributors to analyze the choices
made on both sides of the market: which distributors offer full-line forcing contracts, which retailers
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Digitalization greatly enhances ﬁrms’ abilities to implement new product bundling strate-
gies and to pursue alternative distribution methods for information goods. They have also
fundamentally changed the manner in which most media are purchased and consumed.1 As
a result, new digital technological abilities have brought bundling to the forefront of pol-
icy debates in many media industries such as cable television, movies, music, and books.
These markets for information goods are quickly becoming a large and important part of the
digital economy, and they are characterized by vertically-separated supply chains in which
bundling arrangements are frequently adopted. However, the reasons why ﬁrms choose to
adopt bundling contracts in vertically-separated markets are often not completely under-
stood, especially from an empirical perspective.2
The impact of bundling (both for ﬁrms, and for welfare more generally) hinges critically
on the nature of demand.3 Diﬀerent correlations in tastes across products and markets lead
to very diﬀerent impacts of bundling, and therefore, diﬀerent decisions by ﬁrms regarding
their use of such contractual arrangements. In markets for information goods, the nature
of the product itself is important for understanding the impact and use of bundling and
other contractual arrangements within the supply chain. Speciﬁcally, once a consumer has
acquired an idea or the content of an information good, she does not need to acquire it again.
This means that unlike other non-durable consumption goods, products in these markets are
continually refreshed.4 This constant churn of new content impacts the way one analyses
both demand and supply in these settings. On the demand side, the frequent rotation of
products increases the level of detail one needs to observe in data from these markets, while
simultaneously providing variation in choice sets over time that may be helpful for identifying
demand patterns. On the supply side, the constant refreshment of products may give diﬀerent
incentives to ﬁrms to pursue bundling and alternative distribution arrangements over time as
their product lines change. Unfortunately, it is rare to simultaneously observe detailed data
on both consumption patterns across diﬀerent choice sets and the precise contractual forms
1For example, record labels typically bundle recorded songs into albums, while iTunes and other music
downloading services may allow consumers to download songs individually, access them through monthly
fees, or purchase them in a wider variety of diﬀerent bundles.
2Predicting the use and impact of bundling and other contractual arrangements often requires an empirical
approach, because of the wide range of possible theoretical explanations and predictions. Much of the
theoretical literature on bundling addresses the reasons why upstream ﬁrms might choose to oﬀer pure
bundling contracts. The most closely-related theoretical work is Burstein (1960), which views full-line
forcing as a means of achieving the eﬀects of vertical integration. A more recent strand of the theoretical
literature focuses on the ability of bundling to leverage a ﬁrm’s strongest products to induce retailers to
replace competing upstream products with products from the bundling ﬁrm. See for example, Whinston
(1990), Choi and Stefanadis (2001), Carlton and Waldman (2002) and Nalebuﬀ (2004).
3Another strand of the theoretical literature examines the ability of bundling to implement price discrim-
ination. Upstream ﬁrms may proﬁt from tying their products if the preferences of the downstream ﬁrms
for each good are negatively correlated. Adams and Yellen (1976) provide the ﬁrst formal model of price
discrimination through tying, building on a seminal paper by Stigler (1962). Their work is generalized by
McAfee, McMillan and Whinston (1989) and Salinger (1995) among others.
4For example, television shows oﬀered on a particular cable channel change regularly and aﬀect consumer
substitution patterns across bundles of channels and therefore cable companies’ incentives to bundle. Similar
turnover characterizes movies, music and books.
1and bundling arrangements utilized between upstream content providers and downstream
retail outlets.
In this paper we provide an empirical study of a nascent example of bundling in an
information-goods market, speciﬁcally the video-rental market during the period of 1998-
2002.5 Similar to the music, cable television, books, and other information industries, the
movie rental industry is characterized by the continual introduction of new content, and
demand for content that tends to peak early and decay relatively rapidly over time. Movie
distributors and video retailers acquired the ability to monitor rental transactions during this
period, which led to a series of innovations in the vertical contracts used for distribution.
The initial contracting innovation involved a move from linear pricing to revenue sharing.6
The second major contracting innovation introduced bundling, or full-line forcing (FLF),
in which retailers were oﬀered advantageous contractual terms in exchange for agreeing to
carry the full line of products released by a distributor during a one-year period.
An important advantage of studying this market is the availability of an extensive dataset
that provides detailed information on consumer demand for products within each bundle.
This enables us to estimate a realistic demand model, which forms the backbone of our
bundling analysis. We then develop a model of retailers’ portfolio and contract choices and
estimate the model with a moment inequalities approach. Using the estimated parameters,
we calculate the beneﬁts to upstream and downstream ﬁrms of their decisions to adopt
bundling contracts. To our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst empirical analysis of bundling in
an information goods industry that has panel data on the content being bundled and on
consumer demand for that content. As such, it provides a unique analysis of how demand
patterns and content characteristics drive bundling decisions.
Our model has three main elements. First we estimate a ﬂexible nested-logit demand
system that captures demand interactions between titles and across title categories and allows
for decay over time. The impact of full-line forcing contracts is to change the composition
of the choice set, the inventory of each title and the price per rental. Thus, the focus of the
demand system is to capture the impact of adding or removing a title from the consumer’s
choice set, and of changing inventory and price, on rentals of the relevant title and all other
titles oﬀered by the retailer. The second component of the model considers the retailer
portfolio choice problem. This is a diﬃcult problem because, given the demand substitution
eﬀects already noted, the retailer’s choice of contract type for a particular title is aﬀected
by its choices for all other titles oﬀered by all distributors that are currently available in
the store. We address this problem using a moment inequalities approach (following the
approach developed in Pakes, Porter, Ho and Ishii (2007)). Rather than deﬁning a detailed
model that predicts retailers’ equilibrium strategies, we focus on estimating the ﬁnal piece of
information needed to analyze retailers’ and distributors’ choices of contract types: the value
(positive or negative) of holding inventory. The inequalities are suﬃcient to place bounds on
this value. This approach reduces the diﬃcult portfolio choice problem to a simpler analysis
that is much more feasible to estimate. The third component of the model is to use the
estimated parameters in counterfactual experiments to infer the impact of FLF contracts on
5This setting pre-dates most of the digital applications that are currently driving many policy debates.
However, although the video medium was not digitalized during this period, the cost of reproduction was
low, which introduced many of the same policy issues that other digital media now face.
6This innovation is studied in Mortimer (2008).
2the proﬁts of distributors and stores.
We note that, while the institutional details included in our model are of course diﬀerent
from those that would be required in an analysis of a diﬀerent industry, our extensive demand-
side data enable us to provide a role model for the issues that should be accounted for in
bundling analyses more generally. In particular, a detailed analysis of demand substitution
eﬀects is needed to predict the impact of adding or removing a product to or from a bundle on
own-ﬁrm and competing-ﬁrm proﬁts. A careful model of the supply side is needed to obtain
information on costs to the ﬁrm of increasing the number of products oﬀered. Without these
components, our ability to understand the impact of bundling on ﬁrms and consumers may
be incomplete.
Our results provide useful information on how ﬁrms make decisions in this market. Of the
nine major distributors that oﬀer some form of revenue sharing arrangement, ﬁve also oﬀer
FLF terms. The majority of retailers adopt FLF contracts from at least one distributor. We
estimate a positive value of holding inventory for the majority of retailer-title pairs and use
the estimated supply and demand parameters to analyze the decisions of both upstream and
downstream ﬁrms during a 12-month period. Of the nine major distributors that we focus on,
one is not active in the year we analyze. Two other distributors begin oﬀering FLF shortly
after our period of analysis. Among the six remaining distributors, two oﬀer FLF during this
period and four do not. For these six distributors, we simulate the optimal contract choices
of both upstream and downstream ﬁrms. We ﬁnd that distributors make proﬁt-maximizing
decisions when choosing to oﬀer FLF. Retailers purchasing titles from the distributors that
do not oﬀer FLF have high take-up rates even in the absence of FLF contracts. Thus, in
the counterfactual world in which these distributors oﬀer FLF, retailers switch to the more
generous FLF terms at a high cost to the distributor. In contrast, the distributors who oﬀer
FLF terms beneﬁt from the contractual form by drawing in new retailers who would not
take up the titles under other contractual forms. Interestingly, we also estimate that one of
the “FLF distributors” would lose money on average from FLF contracts for retailers that
do not take a FLF contract in reality. These retailers diﬀer in several observable dimensions
from retailers who take FLF from the studio. For example, FLF retailers are less likely to
compete with a local Blockbuster Video outlet, and much more likely to use non-bundled
revenue-sharing arrangements.
Markets for which detailed supply-side arrangements are observed are often markets for
which demand data are limited. As a result, there are very few previous empirical papers on
bundling within a supply-chain setting. Most relevant to our study, Crawford and Yurukoglu
(2008) estimate the welfare eﬀects of bundling in the retail cable television market. An im-
portant advantage of their study is their focus on an industry for which bundling is currently
an important concern for policy makers, both at the retail level (bundling to consumers) and
within the supply chain. A limitation of their study is that data on consumption behavior
(i.e., consumers’ choice of content) is not observed at a detailed level. In other related anal-
yses of the cable television market, Crawford (2008) examines discriminatory incentives for
bundling, and Byzalov (2008) analyzes the welfare impacts of various restrictions to bundling
arrangements. This last study tracks detailed data on consumption behavior, but does not
observe detailed information about the contractual arrangements on the supply side.7
7In addition, Hastings (2009) provides an empirical assessment of upstream price discrimination in the
3Mortimer (2008) studies the impact of product-by-product vertical distribution arrange-
ments on proﬁts and consumer surplus, but does not address the issue of product bundling
in the supply chain, which is the focus of this paper. The focus on mixed bundling requires
us to expand the data used in Mortimer (2008) considerably. First, we extend the data
from two years to four in order to follow the adoption of FLF contracts. Second, we recover
detailed monthly activity for each store-title pair because our focus on bundling requires us
to implement a much more ﬂexible demand system. In addition, we allow for a more ﬂexible
cost structure at the retail level.
The paper continues as follows. In Section 2 we outline the important institutional
features of the industry; Section 3 describes the data. In Section 4 we provide an overview of
the model. Section 5 considers demand, Section 6 covers the inequalities methodology, and
Section 7 describes our counterfactual analyses. Finally, Section 8 concludes. An appendix
provides additional summary statistics and reduced-form analysis.
2 The Video Rental Market
The video rental industry has two primary tiers: distributors, who distribute movies, and
video rental stores, who acquire movies and oﬀer them for rental and sale to consumers.
Three diﬀerent contractual forms are used to distribute titles targeted to the rental market
from distributors to rental stores. The ﬁrst is linear pricing (LP). Under linear-pricing
contracts, a store purchases a title from the distributor for a ﬁxed cost per tape, usually
between $65 and $70. They may also oﬀer quantity discounts (introducing second-degree
price discrimination).
The second contractual form is revenue sharing (RS). Under revenue-sharing contracts
a rental store leases a title from a distributor for a low upfront cost per tape, but receives
a share of the revenues generated by a title. In the typical RS contract, the distributor
charges an upfront cost of around $8 per tape and receives about 55% of the rental revenue.
The inventory decision of the rental store is often constrained by both maximum and (often
binding) minimum quantity restrictions. RS and LP contracts are both implemented on a
per title basis. That is, for each individual title, the rental store chooses both whether to
purchase the title and the contractual form. All titles available under RS terms are also
available under LP terms, but not all titles available under LP are oﬀered under RS.
In contrast, the third form of contract, the full-line forcing (FLF) contract or output
program, requires the rental store to purchase all titles released by the distributor during
the period of the agreement (typically 12 months) and to take them all under the same
contract type.8 In many other respects FLF contracts resemble RS contracts. For each title
retail gasoline market. At the consumer level, Chu, Leslie and Sorensen (2007) uses data on theatre tickets
to examine the proﬁtability of simple alternative pricing strategies to mixed bundling, and shows that these
alternatives can yield proﬁts that are very close to those of mixed bundling. There is also a small literature
that uses reduced-form analyses to investigate the pro- and anti-competitive eﬀects of slotting allowances,
which are paid by manufacturers to supermarkets in order to reserve shelf space for their products (e.g.,
Marx and Shaﬀer (2004)).
8Some exceptions apply: titles released by the distributor on sell-through pricing contracts are exempt,
and several distributors allow for limitations on the total number of titles that a retailer must accept within
any given month. Usually, this limit is three titles per month: if the distributor releases more than three
titles in a month (a rare event), the retailer is only obligated to accept three of them. Finally, FLF contracts
4taken on full-line forcing terms, the distributor receives an upfront payment per tape and a
share of the revenues, both of which are usually lower than under RS contracts. The quantity
taken by the retailer is again restricted to be within a range, where the lower bound (on
average eleven tapes per title) is again frequently binding. All titles oﬀered on FLF terms
are also available through LP and RS.
Distributors have only a limited ability to price discriminate across retailers. The 1936
Robinson-Patman Act prevents them from oﬀering diﬀerent prices to competing buyers for
exactly the same product. Furthermore, copyright laws permit stores to freely resell tapes
purchased from distributors under LP contracts, which eﬀectively limits their ability to
use second-degree price discrimination. We do observe a few volume discounts under LP
contracts and some negotiated deals under RS (again based largely on volume), and our
estimation takes these into account. There may be some volume discounts for LP contracts
that we do not observe; we include the eﬀects of these discounts on stores’ costs in our
inequalities analysis. The maximum and minimum quantity requirements for RS contracts
also vary by distributor with the box oﬃce of the movie and the size of the store: this
variation is observed in our data and accounted for in our model.
In addition to setting terms for each contractual form, the distributor can, in theory,
choose which contractual forms to oﬀer. In particular, one might expect the distributor to
choose not to oﬀer LP contracts since these are the least ﬂexible contractual arrangements.
In reality, however, RS contracts are not widely used before the end of 1997, and FLF
contracts are not introduced until the middle of our dataset, in February 1999. One likely
reason is that both contractual forms require extensive computer monitoring of millions of
transactions, and only about half of the stores in the industry had the technology to adopt
these contracts by 1998.9 Thus, eliminating LP contracts during the period of our data may
have substantially reduced distributors’ target market.10 This implies that rental stores can
discipline the distributors by opting to take LP contracts when revenue-sharing splits are
not satisfactory.
One further institutional detail concerns “sell-through priced” titles (STP). These in-
clude, for example, children’s movies and some very popular titles: the distributor sells
these movies to all buyers, including video rental stores, for relatively low prices, often
around $20-25 per tape.11 There is no contract choice for sell-through priced titles because
these titles are not available under any other contractual terms. We condition on these titles’
existence in the demand model and account for them in our calculation of the store’s total
returns in the inequalities framework but do not model the distributors’ contract choice.
also typically include opt-out clauses for movies with ‘objectionable’ content.
9Our dataset includes only stores that have the technology to utilize revenue-sharing terms.
10Distributors are eﬀectively prevented from oﬀering LP contracts only to stores without revenue-sharing
capability by the Copyright Act of 1976. This states that the owner of a lawful copy can “sell or otherwise
dispose of” the copy and implies that retailers with the ability to participate in revenue-sharing agreements
cannot be excluded from choosing LP contracts for a title unless LP contracts are not oﬀered to any retailers
for that title.
11Sell-through priced titles are exempt from the requirement that stores choosing a FLF contract take all
of the distributor’s titles on FLF terms.
53 The Dataset
Our primary data source is Rentrak Corporation, an organization that distributes movies
under revenue-sharing and full-line forcing contractual arrangements. They also monitor all
titles at participating retailers, and facilitate payments between retailers and distributors
under the RS and FLF contracts.12 The complete dataset combines information from pre-
vious studies (Mortimer 2007 and 2008) with additional information from Rentrak on FLF
contracts. Over 11,000 retailers used Rentrak between 1998 and 2001, accounting for over
half of all retailers in the industry. Approximately 4,000 of these are Blockbuster Video and
Hollywood Video stores: we do not observe their transactions. We observe 7,525 retailers
(over 30% of all stores in the industry), ranging in size from single-store locations to a chain
with 1,652 locations. For each store we observe transaction data between January 1, 1998
and June 30, 2002 and follow 1,025 titles released during this period.13
For each store we observe the total monthly revenue of a store, its zip code, the size
of its chain and considerable detail regarding product mix, such as the overall percentages
of game, adult, rental, and sales revenues. We also observe the date the store joined the
Rentrak database and the date the store left Rentrak if applicable. The vast majority of store
exits (over 90%) represent store closure.14 The zip code information allows us to supplement
the primary Rentrak data with several additional sources. Phonebook listings of competing
video retail locations in each year, as well as separate indicators of competing Blockbuster
and Hollywood Video locations are included. We also merge in data from the 2000 US Census
on the local demographic characteristics of each store. We deﬁne a local market as a zip code
area: the average zip code contains approximately 24,000 people and 2.6 video retail stores.
Larger areas, such as 4-digit zip codes or Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSA’s) are also
feasible ways of deﬁning markets but are probably too large for most video store customers.
Every movie title is tracked individually, using a title identiﬁer but not the actual ti-
tle name. For each title we observe a distributor identiﬁer (but not the actual distributor
name), its month of release to video, genre (i.e., Action/Adventure, Children/Family, Com-
edy, Drama, Horror, Romance, and Sci-Fi), and MPAA rating (G, PG, PG-13, and R). We
also observe box-oﬃce categories, denoted A, B, C and D. Titles in the A category have
theatrical box-oﬃce revenues of more than $40 million; those in the B and C categories have
revenues of $15-40 million and $0.25-15 million respectively. Titles in the D category do not
have a theatrical release: these are “direct-to-video” titles such as instructional or exercise
videos. Many of these titles are bought only by a single store; we exclude D titles from our
analysis. The dataset includes 212 A titles, 195 B titles, and 618 C titles.
In addition to title characteristics, we observe the terms of the RS and FLF contracts
oﬀered to retailers for each title, as well as retail prices under LP and STP contracts. Rentrak
12Rentrak receives a small cut of the distributors’ proﬁts under RS and FLF contracts. While it may
have a role in persuading distributors to oﬀer RS and FLF contracts, it does not inﬂuence stores’ choices
conditional on the contract types oﬀered for each title. We therefore exclude Rentrak and wholesalers from
our model.
13Full-line forcing arrangements continue to be an important contractual form in the industry for the DVD
format. However, unlike for VHS in the period that we study, the focus of FLF contracts for DVDs has been
older blockbuster titles or “classic” movies.
14For 1,122 stores, data collection ended for titles released after December 1999. We include these stores
in both our demand and supply models up to that date.
6does not provide the actual wholesale prices paid by retailers under linear-pricing terms: we
adjust the retail price to reﬂect the true wholesale price using guidance from Rentrak and
industry sources (see Mortimer 2007 for details).
Finally, at the store-title level we observe the type of contract chosen by the retailer and
the number of tapes purchased. Transaction data are recorded at the store-title-week level,
and provide information on the number of rentals per tape, total weekly revenues per tape,
and inventory levels (which do not vary across weeks). We discard observations for titles
released after January 1, 2002 so that rental activity for each title is tracked for at least 6
months. We aggregate weekly rental data to the month level (both the number of rentals and
average rental prices for the month) in order to smooth out any weekly demand ﬂuctuations.
We therefore have 54 months of transaction data for titles released over 48 months.
We take several steps to clean the dataset. First we exclude observations where average
price per rental is less than $0.50 or more than $7 and those where store demographic data
are missing. We drop ﬁve titles whose wholesale price is zero. Ten titles have two values for
release month: for nine of them the majority of observations have the same (earlier) value so
we assume that the later date refers to a special edition and switch to the earlier date for all
observations. The tenth title has half the observations with one release date and half with
another; we drop this title from the dataset. We are left with 6,393 stores, 961 titles (201 in
the A box-oﬃce category, 188 B titles and 572 C titles) and 59 distributors in the dataset.
Forty-seven of the 59 distributors produce fewer than 6.5 movies per year on average, and
35 of these distributors release fewer than 4 titles during the four years of our sample. On
average, the 47 small distributors each release about 2.2 titles per year, which accounts for
about 23% of all titles. Two of these small distributors oﬀer FLF contracts, which cover a
total of six titles.15 However, most of these distributors do not have enough titles to consider
FLF terms. The remaining 78% of titles are released by 12 “major” studios. The average
number of titles released per year for the major studios is about 16. Among these 12 studios,
three do not oﬀer any type of sharing contract (RS or FLF). Of the remaining 9 studios that
oﬀer some form of sharing contract, 5 also oﬀer FLF terms. The ﬁrst FLF contract appears
in the dataset in February 1999.
Of the 6,393 retail stores in the clean dataset, 6,358 participate in at least one LP
contract during the period of the analysis, 6,150 participate in at least one RS contract, 5,111
participate in at least one FLF contract and 6,171 participate in at least one STP contract.
On average stores take 42% of the titles released per distributor-year. The proportion is
higher for FLF distributors (54%, or 41% if we include only stores that have no FLF contracts
with the relevant distributor and 73% for stores that do FLF with the distributor at any
time) than for other distributors (39%). For the largest 12 studios, on average stores take
59% from non-FLF and 60% from FLF distributors (43% for stores that do no FLF and 73%
for stores that do FLF with the relevant distributor).
Stores are categorized into ten size “tiers,” with tier 1 containing the smallest stores and
tier 10 the largest stores. The average number of titles taken per month increases with store
tier from 9.9 in tier 1 to 13.4 in tier 6. It then falls in each subsequent tier to a low of 11.1
in tier 9, and back up to 12.0 in tier 10. The average number of tapes taken per month
15One oﬀers FLF for their whole portfolio of titles (4 titles released during 2000 and 2001). The other
oﬀers FLF in May 2001; this covers 2 of the 4 titles that the distributor released in the 2001 calendar year.
7increases with every store tier, from 43.9 in tier 1 to 391.6 in tier 10. “FLF stores” take an
average of 1.5 more titles per month (12.4 vs. 10.9), and 49.4 more tapes per month (138.6
vs. 89.2) than “non-FLF stores.”
Additional summary statistics are provided in Tables 1 and 2. Table 1 sets out average
contract terms, numbers of rentals, prices and inventories for each contract type. Averages
are taken across store-title pairs. The average estimated wholesale cost for LP contracts
is $66.82, compared to an average upfront cost of $8.46 for RS contracts, $3.61 for FLF
contracts and a cost of $15.16 for STP contracts. Retailers on average keep 46% of revenues
under RS contracts, and 59% of revenues under FLF contracts. The average minimum
(maximum) number of tapes per title is 10 (24) for RS contracts and 11 (23) for FLF
contracts. Average month 1 rentals are highest under RS contracts but the decay rate is also
greatest for these titles; LP titles have slightly higher demand in month 2 and substantially
higher demand in every other month.
Average inventory levels are highest for titles purchased under sell-through pricing and
RS contracts and lowest for those under LP contracts. Not surprisingly, retailers also extract
the largest number of rentals per tape for titles purchased under LP contracts. Average rental
prices diﬀer very little across contract types: the negative eﬀect of the lower cost per tape
under RS contracts compared to LP contracts is oﬀset in part by the positive eﬀect of the
revenue-sharing component.16 However, a regression of price on indicators for months since
release to video, by contract type, indicates that prices fall faster for RS titles than for LP
titles. This may indicate that the price-increasing eﬀect of a high cost per tape under LP
slightly outweighs the opposing eﬀect of the two-part tariﬀ under RS. It also implies that
the margin on which prices adjust may be the timing of removal of the “new release” sticker,
with concurrent price reduction or increase in the rental period (and resulting decrease in
late fees collected).
Table 2 summarizes the number of titles released by distributors, and taken by stores,
under diﬀerent contract types. The majority of titles in our data are oﬀered under LP
contracts; approximately 50.5% are also oﬀered under RS contracts. No FLF contracts are
oﬀered in the ﬁrst year of our data; a total of ten titles are oﬀered on FLF terms in year 2,
eighteen in year 3, and 38 in year 4. Table 2 further reports that stores on average take many
more titles on LP contracts than on other contract types. Additional summary statistics
that break these numbers down by contract type and set out store size distributions across
diﬀerent contracts are provided in the appendix.
4 Overview of the Structural Model
The summary statistics provide evidence that the majority of large distributors choose to
oﬀer FLF contracts. A large proportion of retailers choose to take them up. A structural
model is needed to understand whether these choices are proﬁtable: that is, to predict the
diﬀerences in consumer demand, retailer revenues and costs and distributor revenues between
the observed scenario and that where FLF contracts are not oﬀered or not taken. The
modeling approach we use has three elements. First, we estimate a demand system that
16Once the inventory has been purchased the store has an incentive to price LP titles below RS titles in
order to draw consumers to the titles for which they capture 100% of the rental revenues.
8captures the demand interactions between titles and across title categories. The second step
is to use moment inequalities to infer the store’s value or cost of holding inventory. The third
step is to use the estimated model to run counterfactual experiments to infer the impact of
FLF contracts on the proﬁts of distributors and stores.
Before discussing the details of the model it is helpful to consider the factors the retailer
takes into account when choosing between contract types. First, and most obviously, the
price and revenue-sharing terms of the contract are important. LP contracts are likely to be
chosen in preference to RS when the store expects high demand for a title.17 Second, the
retailer considers the inventory restrictions for both RS and FLF contracts: in both cases the
minimum quantity restriction is on average higher than the average number of tapes per title
taken under LP contracts and is often binding in our data. The restriction aﬀects retailers
both by increasing the cost of taking the title (the number of tapes to be purchased and
the cost of storing tapes) and also potentially by increasing the expected level of demand
for the title. For example, a higher inventory level implies a higher number of tapes on the
shelf and therefore a title that is more visible to consumers. It may also act as a signal of
high quality or a blockbuster title. Thus, high inventory may lead to high initial demand:
consumers ﬁnd out about and choose to rent the title more quickly than they would have
otherwise. This may also aﬀect later demand for the title because of a durable goods issue:
if a consumer rents a title in one month he is unlikely to rent it again later. We allow for
this by including both inventory and inventory-month interactions in our demand model.18
There are three other potential eﬀects of an increase in inventory. First, increasing the
number of tapes taken per title (or the number of titles) may increase retailer proﬁts by
attracting new consumers to the store, inducing them either to switch from other video
rental stores or to enter the market for the ﬁrst time. Second, if the inventory of title X is
increased and some other title Y is a close substitute released in the same month, then its
rentals are likely to fall which could imply an overall reduction in retailer proﬁts for this pair
of titles.19 Finally, if consumer preferences are correlated across months, then a change in
X’s inventory level in month 1 may aﬀect title Y rentals in later months and this too may
impact retailer proﬁts.20 Our model captures the second of these three eﬀects; the impact
of the other two eﬀects on retailer proﬁts is included in the cost of taking an extra tape,
estimated in the inequalities analysis.
It is worth noting here that stores do not in general face physical inventory constraints.
If they come close to running out of shelf space when storing tapes title-page-forwards, they
simply store them spine-forwards (starting with the oldest titles). If they run out of space
again they can hold some tapes under the counter or in a back room. Thus, the choice of
inventory levels aﬀects demand but not the number of titles that can be displayed.
17Mortimer (2007) demonstrates this in a market that is consistent with the assumptions in our empirical
model.
18A second mechanism through which inventory aﬀects demand is stockouts. We have no data on stockouts
and therefore cannot fully model this issue. We estimate demand at the store-title-month level, therefore
allowing consumers to substitute intertemporally within a month when a stockout occurs.
19For example, this would be the case if title Y is taken on LP or sell-through pricing terms but X is taken
on RS or FLF so that the proportion of the rental revenues captured by the store is higher for Y than for X.
20Again the impact of this substitution eﬀect on store proﬁts depends on the contract types of titles X
and Y.
95 A Model of Demand
5.1 Demand Methodology
The data provide information on the number of rentals and the total revenues for each
title-store in each week. We aggregate this weekly information to the month level for two
reasons. First, stockouts can lead to shifts in observed weekly transactions that are unrelated
to true demand; allowing consumers to substitute across weeks within each month mitigates
this problem. We do not observe periods of stockouts, which can include tapes that are
lost or returned late. This is primarily a limitation that results from the rental nature of
the product. Thus, it is diﬃcult to implement the corrected demand estimator proposed in
Conlon and Mortimer (2008) to account for stockouts explicitly. Second, we account for the
changing set of competing titles due to the release of new titles over time: this would not
be feasible in a weekly framework.21 Our methodology for aggregating to the month level is
as follows. For any title released in month one, we sum over weeks 1 through 4 to generate
month 1 demand.22 Similarly, we sum over weeks 5 - 8 to generate month 2 demand, weeks
9 - 13 to generate month 3 demand, and weeks 14 - 17 for demand in month 4. Finally
we aggregate all remaining weeks into a “months 5 and above” observation. Approximately
84% of all rentals occur in the ﬁrst 4 months after a title’s release to video.23 We construct
prices at the monthly level by dividing monthly revenues by monthly transactions. Finally,
we drop store-title-month observations with zero rentals/revenues.
We deﬁne a title’s competitors in each month as the titles that are released during the
previous 4 months (including the current month). This implies an assumption that titles
released more than 4 months ago do not substitute for current releases. Only titles in this
moving window are included in the analysis for the relevant month.24
We estimate a nested logit model of demand with nests deﬁned as interactions between
genre and box oﬃce class groups (i.e., “A” comedies).25 The demand equation is:
uijmt = δjmt + ζigmt + (1 − σ)εijmt (1)
21Using weekly demand when the choice set changes every week would require that we estimate over 35
diﬀerent choice sets for each title if we allowed for four months of activity per title. This is computationally
impossible for titles that are held by a small number of retailers, and diﬃcult even for widely-held titles,
when we wish to incorporate sensible decay patterns.
22We replace missing or negative values for weekly revenues or transactions with zeros.
23Note that titles released in the last week of a month are tracked for just one week in the ﬁrst month
rather than 4 weeks. This leads to downward bias in the demand estimates for those titles. Fortunately, there
appears to be no correlation between this and distributors, genres, or any other observable characteristic of
movies, and based on industry discussions, we assume that this form of truncation is random. In addition,
the “month 5+” revenues for titles released later in our time period are smaller than those for titles released
earlier.
24Our full dataset includes titles released between months 1 and 54 of our panel. We exclude months 1-4
and months 49-54 from our analysis. This ensures that we include only titles for which we observe at least 6
months of activity and only months for which we observe the full choice set (including titles released in the
previous 4 months). We truncate the data in an analogous way for stores that enter or exit the sample.
25This can be interpreted as a random coeﬃcients model with the random coeﬃcients on group dummies.
See Berry (1994) for a discussion. Since genre and box oﬃce category are the main sources of diﬀerentiation
between titles (and 2 of our 3 observable title characteristics) this seems a natural structure for modeling
heterogeneity in consumer preferences.
10where i indexes consumers, j titles, m stores, t months and g the genre/class group of the
title. The term ζigmt is an idiosyncratic preference term common to all titles in group g and
εijmt is an idiosyncratic preference term speciﬁc to consumer i and the product indexed by
jmt. Cardell (1997) gives conditions such that [ζigmt + (1 − σ)εijmt] has an extreme value
distribution with σ ∈ [0,1] parameterizing the correlation of the idiosyncratic preferences
within group (σ = 0 means no correlation; σ = 1 means perfect correlation). Price varies
across titles, geographic markets and months. The term δjmt is speciﬁed as:
δjmt = δj + γjzm + ηm + θt + βtxj + λtcjm − αpjmt + ξjmt (2)
where δj is a title ﬁxed eﬀect, ηm is a store ﬁxed eﬀect, θt is a month ﬁxed eﬀect, pjmt is
the average price per rental of the tape at store m in month t, and cjm is the inventory of
title j at store m. The last term ξjmt captures any unobservable quality of renting title j
in market m in month t. This could include things such as local promotions of a particular
movie in a month. We interact title dummies with store characteristics: these describe the
demographics of the store’s market. The variables are the percent white, the percent single
and the percent with children. We therefore permit each store to predict the demand for a
particular title based on the demographics of local consumers.26
The decay rate θt captures two eﬀects. The ﬁrst is the simple idea that demand for a
title falls over time as advertising and word-of-mouth “buzz” decrease. The second is the
durable goods issue noted above: if a consumer rents a particular title in month 1 he is
unlikely to be in the market for the same title in month 2.27 We would ideally account
for this eﬀect by including title-month ﬁxed eﬀects, allowing for a completely ﬂexible decay
rate for each title; unfortunately the number of titles is too large for this to be feasible.
Instead, we interact month ﬁxed eﬀects with title characteristics (box oﬃce class, genre, and
rating) and double and triple interactions of these three groups of variables.28 This implies
constraining the decay rate to be the same for all titles in a particular box oﬃce category-
genre-rating cell.29 Finally, we also interact the decay rate with the store’s inventory level
for the particular title. This accounts for the diﬀerent average inventory levels associated
with diﬀerent contract types.
Integrating out the idiosyncratic preference terms yields the following equation for esti-
mation:
ln(sjmt)−ln(s0mt) = δj +γjzm +ηm +θt +βtxj +λtcjm −αpjmt +σ ln(sjmt/gmt)+ξjmt (3)
26We could also have interacted store dummies with title characteristics. We choose not to do this partly
because our title characteristics are not very informative - see below for a discussion. In addition, the implied
eﬀect, that the “quality of a store” diﬀers across types of movies, would identify essentially the same eﬀect
as the γjzm term: that stores serving diﬀerent demographic groups expect diﬀerent movies to be popular.
27There is also a potential seasonality eﬀect: a title released in December may have diﬀerent demand from
one released in June. This eﬀect is absorbed into the title ﬁxed eﬀects, although not diﬀerentially across
months.
28We include only interactions for which there are non-trivial numbers of observations. For example, there
is only one PG action/adventure rated movie so we combine that cell with PG13 action/adventure movies.
29There is one further issue which we would ideally account for by including title-month ﬁxed eﬀects. If
title A is introduced in month 4, it competes with and therefore aﬀects demand for title B in month 7. It
therefore has an impact on residual demand for title B in months 8-10. These interactions between months
would be perfectly accounted for if we had a fully ﬂexible time trend for each title.
11where sjmt/gmt is the share of title j within group g at store m in month t. The outside option
(with share s0mt) is doing something other than watching a new release movie. Its share is
calculated from a market share assumption: we assume that the market size (denoted M) is
equal to 4 movie rentals per month per household in the store’s zip code.
One further aspect of the data complicates the estimation process: we very rarely observe
more than one store per zip code (although we do know the number of stores that exist in
each zip code). We therefore cannot explicitly include the whole choice set in the demand
estimation. We address this by treating each store as a monopolist in its market. If N
stores actually exist in the market (according to the phone book) we assign 1
N of the total
population to the observed store; we model demand for the store as coming from just that
subset of consumers. This implies an assumption that stores in the same market are identical
and have independent populations of potential customers; a change in characteristics might
attract more customers from that population but would not steal business from other stores.
We interpret this as an assumption that, when a consumer visits a video rental store, if he
does not ﬁnd the title he is looking for he will either rent something else or go home rather
than visit a diﬀerent store. The relevant dimension of competition, particularly since we are
considering bundling, is that across distributors within a store rather than that across stores.
We model the former carefully but do not go into details on the latter.30 In reality, if one store
improves its oﬀering over time by adding titles or tapes, it may gain market share from other
local stores. This eﬀect is identiﬁed in the inequalities analysis. However, we do not model
other aspects of inter-store competition such as pricing and speciﬁc portfolio choices. One
obvious concern is with Blockbuster, which has FLF contracts for a large number of titles
and frequently has a larger portfolio than its competitors. We treat Blockbuster like any
other store in the demand equation (in that, if there are 2 non-Blockbuster and 1 Blockbuster
stores in the market, then each observed store’s demand is predicted assuming a population
1
3 of the total in the market). The store ﬁxed eﬀects absorb any diﬀerential eﬀect that a
Blockbuster dummy would have on demand, absent entry or exit by Blockbuster outlets in
a market during our sample.
Three variables in the demand model are likely to be endogenous: price, inventory, and
the share of the title within its group (sjmt/gmt). The demand model includes store, title
and month ﬁxed eﬀects, as well as interactions between title dummies and observable de-
mographic characteristics of a store’s market. Thus, we are concerned about endogeneity
only through unobservables that are not absorbed by these eﬀects, and that aﬀect changes
in prices, inventory and the sjmt/gmt term. We instrument for inventory using the average
inventory of the same title across stores of the same tier.31 Two assumptions are needed to
make this a valid instrument. First, that the costs or constraints of taking inventory for a
30We could alternatively include all observed stores in each market in the estimated demand system and
extend it to include all the stores that actually exist in the market assuming that those we do not observe
are identical to those in the data. We would then simulate the change in demand for store m’s titles when
all stores simultaneously change their contracts and portfolios, probably assuming a symmetric equilibrium.
Given the lack of data we expect this to add little to our results.
31Tiers are deﬁned by Rentrak for the purpose of deﬁning stores’ max and min quantity requirements. We
assume that they are exogenous to the demand equation modeled here. In all cases we take advantage of
the full variation in the data by taking averages over stores in all regions, even when the demand model is
run separately for diﬀerent regions.
12particular title are correlated across stores of a particular size, implying that similar-sized
stores make similar inventory choices. Second, we assume that demand shocks, except those
that are captured by the ﬁxed eﬀects δj and γjzm, are not correlated across markets. Ex-
amples of shocks captured by the ﬁxed eﬀects are title-speciﬁc unobserved advertising, or
particularly high advertising for a children’s movie in towns with a high fraction of house-
holds with children (since that is included in γjzm). Demand shocks that remain in ξjmt and
that are not correlated across markets could include local advertising and word-of-mouth
buzz.
Two particularly relevant sources of variation in the instrument for capacity are unob-
served volume discounts and the impact of minimum and maximum quantity restrictions.
Unobserved volume discounts can be signiﬁcant for titles taken on linear-pricing and sell-
through pricing contracts, impacting the cost of acquiring capacity. Furthermore, the ability
of stores to take advantage of these discounts varies signiﬁcantly by store size. For some
titles, quantity targets necessary for the discounts are explicitly set based on the store size,
or based on the store ordering history for similar titles.32 For other titles, all stores face the
same discount targets.33
For titles taken on revenue-sharing contracts, the variation in the instrument largely
reﬂects the diﬀerential impact of minimum and maximum quantity restrictions implemented
by the distributor. As noted earlier, titles taken on revenue-sharing contracts are subject to
minimum and maximum quantity restrictions, and these restrictions are set separately by
store tier (size) and title. When the quantity restrictions are binding there is, by deﬁnition,
an impact on the store’s capacity choice. For A titles, restrictions are binding for over half of
the store/title combinations, substantially impacting capacity decisions. Furthermore, the
extent to which these restrictions bind tends to vary substantially by store tier. Minimum
quantity restrictions are less frequently binding for larger stores, with the smallest stores
(tier 1) facing binding minimum quantity restriction almost 3 times more frequently than
the largest stores (tier 10). Maximum quantity restrictions are most frequently binding for
the smallest and largest stores, and are binding almost 2.5 times more frequently for these
stores than for medium-sized stores. A similar pattern is observed for B and C titles, with
the minimum quantity restriction binding somewhat more frequently, and the maximum
quantity restrictions binding somewhat less frequently for these titles.
We instrument for sjmt/gmt using two variables: the log of the average number of movies of
the same type (same box-genre-store group) in the month, where the average is across other
stores in the same size tier that oﬀer the relevant title, and the average of ln(sjmt/gmt) for
the same title-month pair across stores of the same tier. The former instrument is correlated
with the number of competitors to this title in this store. We take an average over other
same-tier stores to account for any demand shocks that might aﬀect both the store’s portfolio
choice and demand for title j. The second instrument is clearly correlated with ln(sjmt/gmt):
like the inventory instrument, it is valid under the assumption that demand shocks, which
32For example, when distributing the movie “Velvet Goldmine,” Disney created a target purchase quantity
dependent on the average monthly store rental size (i.e., store tier). A rental store pays the traditional
wholesale price for every copy purchased up to that store’s target amount. The store could then purchase
200% more copies above the target for $20 per tape but return those tape to the studio after 18 weeks.
33For example, when distributing “Saving Private Ryan,” Dreamworks oﬀers a “Buy 10, Get 2 Free”
discount to all stores. See Ioannou, Mortimer, and Mortimer (forthcoming) for more details.
13might aﬀect the share variable, are not correlated across markets.
We tried several instruments for price, including measures of variable costs and average
prices of other similar titles. None of the instruments aﬀected the estimate of the price
coeﬃcient. We believe the reason for this is that after including store, title and month ﬁxed
eﬀects, the only unobservable we need to instrument for is at the store-title level, and our
potential instruments are not correlated with this price variation.34 We therefore conduct
our analysis without instrumenting for price. We report in Section 5.2 the OLS results and
those that instrument for inventory and the ln(sjmt/gmt) variable.
It is worth noting here that there are other potential demand methodologies. We would
ideally interact title and store ﬁxed eﬀects in the nested logit; unfortunately the number
of parameters to be estimated would be infeasibly large. Alternatively we could estimate
a random coeﬃcients model. However, this would imply replacing the (title or store) ﬁxed
eﬀects in the model with (title or store) characteristics. The characteristics available to us
are not suﬃciently informative for this to be a useful approach.35
5.2 Demand Results
We run the demand model separately for 15 diﬀerent geographic regions of the country
since the dataset is too large for us to run the model using all the data together. We
report results for the ﬁrst geographic region in the top panel of Table 3.36 The speciﬁcation
also includes title and store ﬁxed eﬀects and interactions between title ﬁxed eﬀects and
store characteristics (percent of the market who are white, percent single and percent with
children) and between month ﬁxed eﬀects and title characteristics (box oﬃce category, genre
and rating and interactions between these). Column 1 of Table 3 reports results for the
OLS regression. Column 2 adds instruments for within-group share and Column 3 also
instruments for inventory. The R2 is approximately 0.80 in all three models. The fact that
the model ﬁts the data well is particularly useful since our supply-side estimation stays
within-sample in terms of titles and stores. We therefore use all the estimated ﬁxed eﬀects
in our inequalitites and counterfactuals.
The price coeﬃcient in the OLS regression is negative and signiﬁcant, although small.
We believe that the size of the coeﬃcient reﬂects the fact that the demand model captures
very short-run demand: rentals at a particular store in a particular month (selected from
a set of recently-released titles). It is worth noting that this estimate is generated only by
price variation that is not absorbed by the store, title and month ﬁxed eﬀects included in
our model. It is perhaps not surprising that consumers exhibit only small responses to this
34Variation in price at this level (i.e., across months) does, however, exist: for example, after a title has
been stocked at a store for several weeks, the store may remove the “new release” sticker from the tape and
either drop the price or increase the rental period (implying lower collected late fees and a lower observed
price). We believe this source of price variation is primarily determined exogenously because of the use of
rule-of-thumb policies by video retailers in how they instruct employees to move tapes and update stickers
on rental inventory.
35In the next section we regress the sum of the estimated title and store ﬁxed eﬀects on characteristics:
the highest R2 was 0.43.
36This region contains zip codes from 20000 to 24999. It includes areas in the mid-Atlantic such as
Washington DC and parts of Virginia.
14within-store price variation, as this in-sample price variation tends to be small.37
The estimated decay rates are intuitive: month 2 demand is higher on average than
that in month 1 because observed revenues are left-truncated in month 1 for titles released
mid-month. Demand falls in months 3 and 4 and rises again in month 5 because this last
observation includes all subsequent revenues from the title. The inventory coeﬃcient is
positive implying that ﬁrst-month demand increases with the number of tapes on the shelf.
Not surprisingly, this generates a reduction in demand in later months (because residual
demand is lower). The coeﬃcient on within-group share, σ, is approximately 0.63.
Instrumenting for within-group share reduces the σ coeﬃcient. This is consistent with the
existence of demand shocks that aﬀect both within-group share and total demand. Adding
instruments for inventory reduces the coeﬃcient on inventory and leaves the interactions
between inventory and the decay rate essentially unchanged. There are two potential en-
dogeneity stories here. First, if demand is expected to be high for a particular title then
stores will choose high inventory levels, implying a positive bias on all inventory coeﬃcients.
Second, heavy advertising of a title in month 1 might lead stores to expect consumers to be
impatient, demanding access to the title in month 1 rather than in later months. In this
case, the unobservable would lead to high inventory levels and to high demand in the ﬁrst
month; instrumenting should reduce the inventory-month interactions for month 1 only. The
results are consistent with the second intuition.
We repeat the demand analysis for each of the 14 other regions. The price coeﬃcient is
negative as expected for all but one of these. The problematic region contains 446 stores
in the South West, including for example parts of AZ and NV. We exclude this set of
stores from the remainder of our analysis.38 There is some variation in results across the
remaining 14 regions. The (unweighted) average price coeﬃcient is -0.026. Its standard
deviation across regions is 0.014; the minimum value is -0.050 and the maximum is -0.002.
The average inventory coeﬃcient is 0.014, standard deviation 0.004, minimum 0.007 and
maximum 0.021. The R2s in the regressions range from 0.755 to 0.791.
The lower panel of table 3 sets out the price and inventory elasticities of demand that
are implied by our estimates. We calculate the relevant elasticities for each store-title-month
triple and then take averages over the observations in each region and each month since
release. We then take an unweighted average over regions to generate our summary data.
The average elasticity with respect to price over all months since release is low at -0.134. The
average elasticity with respect to inventory is 0.155. As for the main demand results, there
is some variation across regions. The standard deviation in price elasticities across regions
is 0.081; the minimum value is -0.260 and the maximum is -0.011. The standard deviation
in inventory elasticities is 0.034 with a minimum of 0.126 and a maximum of 0.242.
The lower panel of table 3 also documents the variation in elasticities both across months
since release of the title and across Box Oﬃce categories. There is very little variation over
time for the price elasticities.39 The value in month 3 is -0.139, the minimum is -0.143 and
37On one hand, this is a liability of the extremely ﬂexible speciﬁcation of the model, because the rich set
of ﬁxed eﬀects removes variation in price across stores and titles. On the other hand, the ﬁxed eﬀects allow a
much better ﬁt of the model and improve our ability to predict retailers’ supply choices, which is the primary
focus of the paper.
38We also exclude this region from the summary statistics and reduced-form analyses.
39Since there is only a single price coeﬃcient, variation in elasticities across months and box-oﬃce groups
15the maximum is -0.127. The variation for inventory elasticities is displayed in Figure 1 of the
appendix. They are all positive, as expected, implying that a title with more tapes on the
shelf has higher demand than other titles. The inventory elasticity for Box Oﬃce A titles is
higher than those for other Box Oﬃce categories, and for each group the elasticity decreases
over time since release.40
Finally we regress the estimated store-title quality levels on observable store and title
characteristics. Results for the ﬁrst region are reported in the appendix; those for other
regions are similar. The goal is two-fold: ﬁrst to check that title and store characteristics
have the expected signs, and second to demonstrate the inability of these characteristics to
explain the majority of variation in the data. The results are intuitive. Box oﬃce cate-
gory A titles have higher estimated quality than those in categories B and (particularly) C.
Action/adventure movies and comedies have higher demand than other genres; children’s
movies, romances and science ﬁction movies have particularly low rental demand. Markets
with a high percent female consumers have high demand for video rentals; those with a high
proportion of family heads who are single mothers have particularly high demand and those
with a high proportion of family heads who are single without children have particularly
low demand. The Blockbuster dummy is positive and signiﬁcant, probably indicating that
Blockbuster chooses to enter high-demand markets.41 The R2 on these regressions is only
0.4: even with a very ﬂexible functional form, our observable title and store characteristics
are able to explain less than half of the variation in the data.42
6 The Supply Side: Moment Inequalities
Having estimated a detailed demand model, the ﬁnal piece of information needed to analyze
retailers’ and distributors’ choices of contract types is the value (positive or negative) of
holding additional tapes. This could include negative eﬀects such as insuring and restocking
inventory, as well as valuable eﬀects such as the ability to sell used inventory, and using
inventory depth to maintain a long-term customer base and draw new customers into the
store. It also includes the eﬀect of an increase in inventory of one title on later rentals of
other titles that is not incorporated in the demand model. We allow the eﬀect of additional
inventory to diﬀer between titles taken on LP and RS contracts, thereby allowing retailers to
respond to unobservable diﬀerences between the two contracts or to display organizational
inertia in their choice of contract.
We use the method of moments inequalities estimator developed in Pakes, Porter, Ho
and Ishii (2007) to estimate the value of holding additional inventory. That paper describes
is generated from variation in the level of demand and price across months and box oﬃce categories.
40These results are consistent with the idea that consumers who rent new releases (particularly Box Oﬃce
hits) are inﬂuenced by advertising such as window displays and the number of tapes available. Consumers
who rent movies after the ﬁrst month or so since release do not expect as much buzz and are less inﬂuenced
by these kinds of advertising.
41The coeﬃcient on the number of households is negative and signiﬁcant, implying that large markets where
Blockbuster is not located have low demand. The coeﬃcient on median income is negative and signiﬁcant:
wealthier markets have fewer movie rentals, perhaps because wealthy families choose more expensive leisure
activities.
42This motivates our use of a nested-logit framework, in which we can feasibly include both title and store
ﬁxed eﬀects.
16how to use inequality constraints to generate conditions that can be used for estimation and
inference. The intuition in our application is straightforward: we assume that on average,
stores’ proﬁts from the observed portfolio of titles and choices of inventory must exceed
proﬁts from alternative portfolios and choices of inventory. The estimated demand model
predicts the change in the number of rentals caused by changes in inventory holdings, prices
and the consumer’s choice set that result from a portfolio deviation. This determines the
main input to the inequalities analysis: the proﬁt change up to the inventory holding cost.43
We derive inequalities from every store’s choice of contract for titles that we observe it
to take. We include all titles that are taken on RS and LP contracts (for which the store
makes decisions at the title level).44 The ﬁrst inequality for a particular store-title pair is
generated by deﬁning the store’s alternative choice as dropping that title. This generates
an upper bound on the value of holding inventory. The second inequality deﬁnes the store’s
alternative as adding tapes to the existing inventory for the relevant title. We add 10%
of the existing inventory where possible; if this brings total capacity above the maximum
quantity restriction we add tapes up to that restriction. This provides a lower bound on
the inventory-holding value.45 We assume that the store has perfect foresight regarding the
titles to be released to video in the following ﬁve-month period,46 but that it may imperfectly
predict demand for those titles, or the value of holding inventory.
6.1 The Store Proﬁt Equation
Our ﬁrst step for specifying the moment inequalities is to predict the total return to the
store from its contracts with all distributors over the four-year period covered by the data.
First, we use the estimated coeﬃcients from the demand model to predict the market share
of title j at store m in “month since release” t:
sjmt(ˆ δ, ˆ γ, ˆ η, ˆ θ, ˆ λ, ˆ α, ˆ σ, ˆ ξ) =








43We use the inequalities methodology in preference to a more standard method such as a logit or probit for
two reasons. First, logit and probit methods ignore dynamic eﬀects. The inequalities methodology enables
us to diﬀerence out dynamic eﬀects without generating a bias in estimation because the alternative portfolio
choices deﬁned in the inequalities estimator are not required to be optimal for the store. Second, since the
store makes choices regarding FLF contracts at the distributor-year level but those regarding RS and LP at
the title level, it is not obvious at which level to deﬁne the logit or probit estimator.
44We exclude titles on FLF contracts because the store makes these decisions at the studio-year level,
rather than at the title level. We also exclude sell-through priced titles (for which there is no contract
choice) and titles that are in release in our data for less than six months. We do not consider store-title pairs
where the store is not observed to take the title. We could generate inequalities where the alternative was
to take these titles, but this would require us to predict the unobserved quality ξjmt (rather than using an
estimated value from the demand model), likely adding noise to the estimation.
45We choose not to deﬁne alternatives by dropping tapes rather than titles because many stores take the
minimum inventory per title required by the RS contract.
46Titles’ theatrical release dates are about ﬁve months before their release to video, so store managers
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for Jgmt the set of all products in group g held by store m in month t.
Next we aggregate over months and subtract store m’s total payment to the distributor
for title j. For a title oﬀered under RS and LP contracts, we denote the return rjm as
rjm(·) =
( Ptj+4




tj qtjmptjm − uRS
j c if RS
(6)
where qtjm is the number of rentals, Fj is the wholesale cost per tape under LP, yRS
j is the
portion of revenues kept by the return under RS, and uRS
j is the upfront fee per tape under
RS. As before, we consider the ﬁrst 4 months plus a ﬁfth observation for later months.
The number of rentals may be constrained by the inventory of the title, cjm, and the
maximum number of rentals per tape, τjm.47 Additional constraints, in the form of minimum
and maximum quantity restrictions on inventory purchases, also apply for RS contracts. We
denote the constrained inventory as ˜ cjm.48 Thus, the quantity actually rented out is given
by:
˜ qjmt = min(Msjmt(·),τjm˜ cjm). (7)
This implies that the total return to store m from title j, (oﬀered under both RS and




























jm indicate the contract chosen by retailer m for title j, and the obs super-
script denotes “observed” contractual choices.49
Given robs














, ˆ δ, ˆ γ, ˆ η, ˆ θ, ˆ λ, ˆ α, ˆ σ, ˆ ξ,˜ c,k) − C(xm,xj,µ) ˜ cjm

(9)
+ηm + ρ(˜ cms,kms) + εms,
where Js is the set of titles released by distributor s during the time period covered by
our data and C(xm,xj,µ) is the cost (positive) or value (negative) of holding a tape. We
47We consider τ to be a technology parameter that is not chosen by the store. We deﬁne τ to be the
95th percentile of a store’s distribution of the number of rentals per tape for titles in the same box-oﬃce
category and contract type in the same month after release. Thus, we allow for an extremely ﬂexible non-
parametric speciﬁcation of the τ parameter. In principle, however, stores may have some discretion over
how intensively to use their inventory (up to the point where a tape physically breaks) and we rule out this
source of endogeneity. For a detailed discussion of this issue, see Mortimer (2007).







49When a store chooses not to stock a title, we assume it makes no contribution to the store’s proﬁt.
18estimate C(·) as a reduced-form function of store and title characteristics with parameter
vector µ. A store ﬁxed eﬀect is denoted ηm, and ρ(˜ cms,k ms) is the eﬀect of the store’s choice
of contracts at the end of our four-year sample on subsequent proﬁts.50 The ﬁnal term, εms,
is an unobservable such as store prediction error in demand or in the cost or value of holding
inventory.
6.2 The Inequality Estimator
We now demonstrate how inequalities are generated when we allow for two types of deviations
from the store’s observed choices: dropping a particular title, or adding to the existing
inventory of that title.
For example, consider title j0 released by distributor s0. Suppose that the store chooses















m is deﬁned analogously to πobs
m for the alternative portfolio choice (e.g., the store
drops title j0 and holds all other contracts ﬁxed). The expectation is taken conditional on
Im, the store’s information set at the time when it makes its choice. Letting kobs
ms0(j0) indicate
that the j0th element of kms0 is store m’s observed contract and k0
ms0(j0) indicate that the
title has been dropped, and assuming that title j0 has zero demand by the end of the 4-year



























0))}+∆εms0] | Im} ≥ 0. (11)
The diﬀerence function ∆˜ cjm(kobs
ms0(j0),k0
ms0(j0)) = (˜ cobs
jm−˜ c
altj0
jm ) = ˜ cjm(kobs
ms0(j0))−˜ cjm(k0
ms0(j0)),
and similarly for ∆r(.). The calculation incorporates the revenue from all titles released by
all distributors in all years in the data, since changing a single contract may aﬀect demand
for other distributors’ titles, even if these are released in later months.51 Each title taken
by the store implies a similar ‘drop the title’ inequality. The second inequality for each title
(‘add inventory’) is generated in an analogous way.
Finally, we take an expectation conditional on the instruments zms0, where s0 is the
distributor whose titles are switched by the store. We deﬁne these instruments such that
50The arguments in ρ(·) are as follows: kms is a vector denoting store m’s observed contract type for
each title taken from distributor s, and ˜ cms is a similarly deﬁned vector of observed inventory choices. In
estimation, we choose alternative portfolios whose end-of-period contracts are the same as those observed in
the data. Thus, the ρ(˜ cms,kms) term, like ηm, is precisely diﬀerenced out of our inequalities. This modeling
choice may imply that the alternative portfolio used in our inequalities is not the optimal alternative for the
store. However, as discussed below, this will not aﬀect the consistency of the estimates.
51The demand framework allows a change in contract for title j to aﬀect the within-group share and
therefore demand for title k in all months where they overlap in consumers’ choice sets. We assume that
title k’s demand in months before j is released is unaﬀected by a change in j’s contract type, implying that
consumers do not predict this change. If title k is active after title j has left the dataset, we assume that its
demand in these later months is unaﬀected by j’s contract change.
19zms0 ⊂ Im and E(εms0 | zms0) = 0. This together with equation (11) implies that:
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jm over all titles, and the change in the total store-level value











We use predicted values of several inputs to the proﬁt equation for both observed and
alternative portfolios: the constrained inventory ˜ cjm, prices pjtm and technology (rentals per
tape) τjm. Our assumptions are as follows. We note that prices vary only slightly between
titles within a store.52 We therefore do not directly model a price change after the change in
portfolio. Instead we use the average price for each month for the particular store-box oﬃce
category-contract type-month combination being considered.53 Similarly, we do not formally
model the ﬁrm’s choice of ˜ cjm and τjm for every title. We deﬁne τjm as the 95th percentile of
the distribution of τ observed for titles in the same store-box oﬃce category-contract type
and for ˜ cjm we use the same average used as in expected demand.54,55
Finally we convert the expectations in equation (12) into sample averages across stores.56
52The average within-store price of an A title is $2.88 for RS contracts and $2.84 for LP. The equivalent
prices for B titles are $2.79 and $2.80; those for C titles are $2.73 and $2.73 respectively.
53We use this average because there is less variation within-store across titles than there is across stores
for a particular title (see Mortimer (2007) for evidence on this). We could have considered titles in the same
store-genre-box oﬃce category-contract type-month, consistent with the nest deﬁnitions in the demand
model, but encountered problems with small sample sizes in some cases. Consistent with the assumptions
in the demand model, we exclude store-title-month triples with zero transactions.
54In the second (‘add inventory’) inequalities, increasing the inventory of a particular title could force the
store to hold a total storewide inventory level higher than our deﬁnition of its maximum capacity (110% of
that observed for the store in any month in the data). In this case we assume that the store’s inventory
equals that maximum cutoﬀ, provided it implies an inventory level for the relevant title that is above its
observed inventory; otherwise no inequality is generated.
55In a few cases, the store-box-contract group is empty, so we cannot get predicted inventory from this
method. In such cases, we use the minimum number of tapes required by the distributor as the expected
inventory level for RS titles. For LP titles, we use the average number of tapes per LP title taken by the store
for titles in neighboring box oﬃce categories. Remaining missing values for LP contracts are ﬁlled in using
1
3 of the minimum quantity required under RS for the same title: this is the industry rule of thumb for the
number of tapes taken under LP. We predict price and τjm in the case where the store-box-contract group is
empty using other contract types. Prices for titles taken on LP contracts are deﬁned as the maximum of the
average prices in the same store-box group under RS, FLF and sell-through priced contracts; those for titles
taken on RS contracts are the average of the average prices under the other three contract types. Finally, in
all these cases we deﬁne maximum τ as the maximum of the maximum τ’s under the other three contract
types. If any of these values are still missing we use the average price or maximum τ in the store-contract
type for titles in neighboring box oﬃce groups or the average price in the store-contract type-box oﬃce
category for neighboring months.
56We stack the inequalities for all regions before taking the average over stores. We therefore estimate a
20We also average over alternative choices j0 in a particular distributor-year before interacting
with the instruments. Considering ﬁrst the ‘drop the title’ inequalities, this implies the






















 ⊗ g(zms0) ≥ 0 (14)
where y indexes years, s0 indexes distributors, Qys0 is the number of titles released by dis-
tributor s0 in year y, g (.) is any positive-valued function of the instruments and M is the
number of stores in the data. We therefore have one moment per distributor-year-instrument
triple. We exclude distributor-years where no titles are released and average within each year
(before taking the store average) over distributors that release fewer than ﬁve titles during
our panel. This generates 56 distributor-year moments per instrument. Our methodology is
analogous for the ‘add inventory’ inequalities, again generating 56 distributor-year moments
per instrument. The identiﬁed set of parameter values is the set of parameters that satisfy
the implied system of inequalities. If there are no feasible parameters we use a method
of moments methodology, minimizing the Euclidean distance by which the inequalities are
violated.
The instruments zms0 (deﬁned at the store-distributor level) are required to be uncorre-
lated with εms0.57 The term εms0 includes store prediction error on: revenues, the value of
holding inventory, the value of used tapes, and any other unforseeable costs to the store from
altering its contracts with distributor s0. The error term may also contain econometrician
measurement error. We assume that the error does not contain unobservables that diﬀer
across contract types and that aﬀect store choices; we rely on the ﬂexible speciﬁcation of
the inventory-holding value to capture such eﬀects. Our instruments are a constant and
indicators for the size of the store’s chain. These are known to the store when it makes its
choices and perfectly observed by the econometrician and are therefore uncorrelated with the
error term. They are likely to be correlated with retailers’ portfolio and inventory choices,
for example because market size, the percent urban/suburban, and average education levels
diﬀer across the markets where diﬀerent-sized chains locate.58
6.3 Results
We deﬁne several speciﬁcations for the value or cost of holding a tape including diﬀerent
combinations of the following variables: a constant, indicators for Box Oﬃce category B and
C titles, indicators for small and large retailers, and indicators for retailers from small and
large chains.59 We also include an indicator for titles taken on LP contracts and interactions
single set of costs for all stores, taking into account all of the region-speciﬁc demand estimates from Section
6.
57They must also be positive to ensure that no inequalities are reversed by the interaction with zmz0.
58Less ﬁnely-measured chain size dummies are included explicitly in the cost equation to account for any
potential volume discounts. We only ﬁnd substantial diﬀerences between stand-alone stores and chains of
two or more outlets.
59Small chains are those containing 2-44 stores, large chains have 112-1652 stores and chains with a single
store are the excluded category. Small stores are in tiers 4-6, large stores are in tiers 7-10 and those in tiers
21between this and the other variables. This allows stores to have diﬀerent preferences for
diﬀerent contract types. The results are given in Table 4. The estimate of µ was a singleton
for every speciﬁcation: that is, there was no parameter vector that satisﬁed all the inequality
constraints. As noted in Pakes, Porter, Ho and Ishii (2007), this does not imply that we
should reject the speciﬁcation. The result is very likely to be caused by the random distur-
bances in the inequalities. The probability that all the inequalities will be satisﬁed can be
made arbitrarily small by increasing the number of inequality restrictions.60 We report the
conservative 95% conﬁdence intervals derived in Pakes, Porter, Ho and Ishii (2007).
The ﬁrst speciﬁcation in table 4 includes a constant and indicators for medium and
large chain sizes, for medium and large retailer sizes and for titles taken on LP contracts.
All the coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant at p=0.05. The constant term is positive; all the rest
are negative, implying that larger stores and chains have a lower cost (or a higher value)
per tape, and that stores perceive a larger value of taking LP contracts compared to RS
contracts. Speciﬁcation 2 adds interactions between the LP indicator and the store tier and
chain size indicators. The non-interacted store characteristics then become insigniﬁcant so
Speciﬁcation 3 drops them and includes instead indicators for titles in Box Oﬃce B and C
categories. Finally, Speciﬁcation 4 adds interactions between the LP indicator and these
Box B and Box C indicator variables. We use this ﬁnal speciﬁcation as the input to our
counterfactual simulations because it provides a richer level of detail than the others.
Table 5 translates the estimates from Speciﬁcation 4 into the implied cost per tape for
each type of retailer and each type of title. Negative numbers indicate value to the store.
Two ﬁndings emerge from table 5. First, most of the estimates are negative, implying that
stores generate a positive value from holding tapes that is not captured in the rest of our
model. For RS titles, the values are $2.66 per tape for box A titles, essentially zero for box
B titles and $10.65 per tape for box C titles. There are several reasons why additional tapes
may be valuable to the store. For example, the store generates approximately $9 of revenues
from selling each used tape. Unobserved volume discounts or negotiated deals could reduce
the cost to the store of taking tapes compared to the cost used in our analysis. In addition,
adding tapes to the shelf may increase retailer proﬁts by attracting new consumers to the
store or avoiding stockouts. C titles may be particularly valuable because they are often niche
or “arthouse” titles that appeal to a particular segment of the population and therefore may
attract more customers from the store’s competitors than more mainstream movies. For all
of these reasons the small estimated value to the store of holding RS inventory seems quite
reasonable.
The second ﬁnding is that most retailers (all but the stand-alone outlets) have a much
higher value per tape for LP titles than for RS titles. We have two hypotheses that could
explain this ﬁnding. First, chains may make more money from LP than from RS because
they are able to negotiate volume discounts on LP titles (beyond the 20% discount already
incorporated into our model) or because they keep a higher proportion of the revenue from
selling used tapes under LP. Stand-alone outlets may not have suﬃcient volume to negotiate
discounts and may have trouble generating demand for their used tapes. Alternatively, chains
1-3 are the excluded category.
60In fact most of the inequalities are close to being satisﬁed. In our preferred speciﬁcation a median of
170 stores (out of a total of 6393) violate each moment inequality and the median amount by which these
stores violate the moment is only $9.16.
22may have deeper relationships with LP wholesalers that make them inclined to take more
titles on LP contracts. For example, unobserved promotional activities and other attention
from LP wholesalers might inﬂuence the contract choices of chains. Stand-alone outlets
would be unlikely to receive this attention; they may also have credit constraints with LP
wholesalers that push them towards taking RS titles. We cannot distinguish between these
hypotheses within the inequalities framework. The counterfactual analyses below provide
some information on the extent to which these alternative explanations may apply.
7 Analysis of the Use and Impact of Full-line Forcing Contracts
Our goal in the ﬁnal stage of the analysis is to analyze the proﬁtability of retailers’ and
distributors’ contracting choices. We ask whether the distributors that choose to oﬀer FLF
contracts make more money than they would otherwise, and whether the non-FLF distrib-
utors would lose money by oﬀering FLF terms. Finally, we examine whether retailers on
average made proﬁtable choices.
The parameters estimated in our demand and supply models allow us to predict retailer
choices and proﬁts for both retailers and distributors. We focus our analysis on six large
distributors during a 12-month period of our panel (months 30-41), and the model’s predicted
outcomes when FLF is either oﬀered or not. We focus on months 30-41 in order to allow
some time for learning about the new contract type, and a 12-month period to correspond
to the length of FLF contracts used in the industry. The six distributors that we consider
are among the nine large distributors described in section 3 that oﬀer some type of sharing
contract (RS and/or FLF). Two of the six oﬀer FLF terms.61
For each focal distributor, we would ideally simulate the dynamic decision-making process
of each retailer,62 considering all possible combinations of titles and contract types from all
distributors over the 12-month period analyzed. However, this is computationally infeasible
because of the large number of titles available in each year. Instead we approximate the
dynamic process using a three-stage model.63 First we predict retailer and distributor proﬁts
under the assumption that the retailer takes the FLF contract from the relevant distributor
holding all other retailers’ choices ﬁxed (this is our counterfactual for non-FLF distributors
and our observed scenario for FLF distributors). Second, we predict the retailer’s choices
if FLF is not available. This is the more complex step since an ordering decision in one
month aﬀects demand for titles and therefore ordering decisions in all future months. We
make the simplifying assumption that retailers’ orders only take into account titles that are
available in the current month (those that are released within the previous four months or
61Of the remaining three distributors, two oﬀered FLF contracts shortly after the period we analyze; the
last, also a FLF distributor, exited the market at the beginning of our period of analysis.
62For each distributor, we analyze the decisions of all retailers that are active from months 30-41 and that
either do not take a FLF contract or take FLF and are compliant with the contract. We deﬁne compliance as
taking at least (N-2) titles during the year, where N is the number of titles released by the FLF distributor.
This allows retailers to refuse to take a few titles due to objectionable content, but excludes retailers that
participate in a trial period and then switch away from FLF. Retailers cannot choose contract types that
are not oﬀered for the relevant title.
63For example, the full dynamic model would require us to evaluate 1.20e+29 diﬀerent possible outcomes
for the ﬁrst FLF distributor in our data. The three-stage model requires evaluation of 647801 combinations
which takes approximately 16 hours of computer time.
23in the current month). That is, stores make a static choice by considering static ﬁrst-month
proﬁts.64 Our assumption that each store operates in a separate market implies a unique
equilibrium.65 The third step is to allow each retailer to choose the more proﬁtable option:
the FLF contract or the non-FLF portfolio chosen in the static model.66
We hold ﬁxed retailers’ choices of contract types both before and after the counterfactual.
In a static model choices made in month t do not anticipate contracts available in month t+1
so the ﬁrst assumption is reasonable. The second assumption implies that the distributor
chooses to implement (or remove) the FLF contract for just a single period (a single year).
We simplify by assuming, as we do in the moment inequalities analysis, that inventory and
rental price are determined by contract type (the average in the data for the store-box-
contract type-month). We deﬁne the unobserved quality of newly-taken titles to be the 25th
percentile in the store-box-genre group. The contract terms of any alternative contracts are
determined using the modal values over all stores for that contract type and title.67
7.1 Interpreting the Relative Value of LP Contracts
We ﬁrst consider to what extent the incremental inventory-holding value associated with
LP contracts aﬀects retailers’ bottom-line proﬁts. To the extent that they aﬀect retailer’s
bottom-line proﬁts, they should be taken into account in the model when the retailer chooses
between the FLF contract and its alternative. To the extent that they do not aﬀect bottom-
line proﬁts, we assume that they capture a reluctance to use RS contracts speciﬁcally rather
than sharing contracts in general. Under this assumption we can identify the incremental
inventory-holding value of LP titles that aﬀects retailers’ proﬁts by comparing data on FLF
take-up with the model’s predictions when diﬀerent proportions of this value are assumed
to aﬀect retailers’ bottom-lines. We then rely on this proportion of the value of holding
inventory for LP titles when calculating counterfactual retailer proﬁts in section 7.2.
64On average approximately 20% of the average title’s revenues are realised within the ﬁrst month.
65In order to make the analysis feasible we assume that, when the retailer takes a FLF contract from a
non-FLF focal distributor, it can only drop titles from other distributors that are the most negatively aﬀected
in terms of revenues at the 25th percentile. When the retailer re-optimizes without a FLF contract from a
FLF focal studio we assume that it does not take titles that have revenue below the top 25th percentile of all
its titles. We also adapt the way costs are handled in this myopic counterfactual. We assume that the costs
and values estimated in the inequalities analysis, and the upfront fees for all contract types, are amortized
over the life time of the title proportionate to the average percent of the title’s lifetime rentals that occur in
the ﬁrst month. This average is across all same-tier stores and all same-box oﬃce group titles taken on the
same contract type. The store takes only the ﬁrst month’s portion of costs into account when making its
static choices.
66We conduct a robustness test of the static model by comparing the results to those from a dynamic model
where each retailer accounts for all future demand eﬀects and interactions between titles when choosing its
portfolio. Here we consider just the three-month period between months 30 and 32. We add the following
simplifying assumption to the dynamic model: when the retailer re-optimizes without a FLF contract from
the focal studio we assume that it does not take titles that are taken in the observed data by fewer than 10%
of same-tier retailers. Under these assumptions the static and dynamic models have very similar predictions
for the set of titles and contract types chosen by stores.
67In fact they are constrained by Section 2 of the Clayton Act to be the same for all stores for a particular
title. We take a modal value because a small number of stores negotiate special deals such as volume discounts
with particular distributors. These are classed as second-degree price discrimination and are therefore not
illegal. We assume that stores do not expect to be able to negotiate such deals for alternative contracts.
24Table 6 has seven panels that relate to the six distributors considered in detail in the
simulations. The ﬁrst FLF distributor has two panels relating to the 294 (1574) retailers
that choose to take (not to take) the FLF contract in reality. For the second FLF distributor,
nearly all retailers choose to accept FLF terms. Thus, this distributor has just one panel
relating to 2094 retailers, all of which took the FLF contract.68 Four additional panels relate
to each of the non-FLF distributors, and analyze all 2316 retailers active during this period.69
Within each panel, the ﬁrst row lists the observed portfolio choices while the second and
third rows report predicted choices when FLF is, or is not, an option.
The ﬁrst column of Table 6 reports the average number of titles taken on each contract
type, assuming that 100% of the incremental LP inventory-holding value applies to retailers’
bottom-lines. The model does a reasonably good job predicting retailers’ portfolio and
contract choices for the ﬁrst two non-FLF studios. The ﬁt is not as good for non-FLF studios
3 and 4: the model over-predicts RS take-up for non-FLF studio 3 and over-predicts the
number of titles not taken for non-FLF studio 4.70 For FLF studios, the relevant comparison
is between the observed store portfolios and those predicted when FLF is an option for
retailers. In this case, the ﬁt of Model 1 is less good: while the ratio of LP to RS titles is
often reasonable and the ﬁt for retailers that choose not to take the FLF contract is very
good, the model substantially under-predicts FLF takeup.
The second column of Table 6 assumes that none of the estimated incremental LP
inventory-holding value aﬀects retailers’ proﬁts, implying that none are taken into account
when retailers compare their proﬁts from taking and rejecting the FLF contract. Not sur-
prisingly, this model predicts much more FLF takeup for all stores. This improves the ﬁt of
the model for retailers that choose to take a FLF contract from a FLF distributor. However,
it reduces the ﬁt substantially for the 1574 retailers that do not choose to take the FLF
contract from the ﬁrst FLF distributor: now 9 titles out of 18, on average, are predicted to
be taken on FLF terms compared to 0 in the observed data.
The third column applies a percentage of the incremental LP inventory-holding value
to retailers’ bottom-lines that minimizes the sum of squared diﬀerences between observed
and predicted choices.71 The estimated fraction is 44%.72 This model predicts the data
quite well. In particular, for the ﬁrst FLF distributor, we now see a separation between the
retailers that choose not to take a FLF contract (predicting on average 3.0 out of 18 titles
for FLF) and those that take the FLF contract (on average 7.9 out of 11.6 titles).73 The ﬁt
68Only 35 retailers choose not to take FLF from this studio, a sample too small to analyze.
69The total number of retailers considered for each FLF distributor is less than 2316 because some retailers
are non-compliant, engaging in short trial periods of FLF that we do not attempt to analyze.
70We do not expect the model to ﬁt the data perfectly for every distributor and every year considered
separately, because the inequality estimates are averages across all distributors, retailers and months in the
data.
71An observation is a retailer-FLF distributor pair.
72For example, stores in tiers 7-10 that are members of large chains are predicted by the inequalities
analysis to have a value per tape of $2.66 for RS titles from Box oﬃce group A and a value of $48.30 per
tape for LP box A titles. Applying 44% of the LP terms implies that $22.75 of this is associated with a
unobserved dollar value of LP while the remaining $25.55 is inertia that does not directly aﬀect retailers’
proﬁts. Some of the value that is not aﬃliated with a direct dollar value may also aﬀect retailers’ decisions
regarding FLF take-up. That is, in fact we are estimating an upper bound on the proportion that aﬀects
bottom-line proﬁts.
73The observed average number of titles taken on FLF by FLF retailers is less than the total number of
25is also good for the second FLF studio: we predict on average 3.9 out of 5.3 titles.
7.2 Results: Proﬁtability of Retailer and Distributor Choices
Table 7 predicts the proﬁtability of retailer and distributor choices under Model 3. The ﬁrst
column of Table 7 displays average retailer proﬁts, the second sets out average proﬁts per
retailer for the focal distributor (the distributor whose choices we analyze) and the third
reports average total proﬁts per retailer for all other distributors. Each panel relates to
diﬀerent focal distributors, and reports average proﬁts when FLF is and is not oﬀered by
the focal studio.
Consider ﬁrst the non-FLF distributors in the bottom four panels. In each case we ﬁnd,
as expected, that retailers have higher average predicted proﬁts when given the additional
option of taking a FLF contract. The proﬁts of non-focal distributors diﬀer very little across
the two scenarios. Predicted FLF take-up, set out in Table 6, is relatively high for these
distributors. However, the second column of Table 7 shows that the predicted proﬁts of the
focal distributor are higher in the “no FLF” scenario. That is, non-FLF distributors seem
to be making proﬁt-maximizing choices regarding whether to oﬀer FLF contracts. There
are two reasons why FLF is unproﬁtable for these distributors, both of which can be seen
from the last column of Table 6. First, several non-FLF distributors have relatively high
predicted retailer take-up of titles without oﬀering a FLF contract, so there is little change in
the number of titles taken when they oﬀer FLF terms. Second, retailers often switch a large
proportion of titles from LP to FLF contracts, implying a large reduction in the upfront
fees collected by the distributor. We conclude that these distributors are relatively strong
players in the market, producing attractive titles that most retailers already take on LP or
RS contracts. These distributors lose money when they also oﬀer more generous FLF terms.
The picture is diﬀerent for FLF distributors. Again we ﬁnd that retailers’ average proﬁts
increase when they are given the option of taking the FLF contract, and that other studios
are aﬀected very little by the focal studio’s choice. However, FLF distributors are predicted
to make money from oﬀering FLF contracts. The reason is simple for the second FLF
distributor, FLF terms generate a large increase in retailer take-up of the six titles released
during the year (from an average of 2.6 to 4.5 titles per retailer). That is, this less strong
distributor gains substantially from oﬀering generous terms to induce stores to carry all of
its titles.
The story is slightly diﬀerent for the ﬁrst FLF distributor. This distributor makes positive
proﬁts from FLF take-up by the set of stores that are observed in the data to take the FLF
contract (“FLF stores”), but negative proﬁts from FLF take-up by “non-FLF stores.” The
reason is again clear from Table 6: FLF stores have a bigger increase in overall take-up
when they take the FLF contract than do non-FLF stores. Most non-FLF stores that are
predicted to take the FLF contract are taking the majority of titles from the distributor
already. Furthermore, the distributor may be able to predict which stores take the FLF
contract and which do not, for two reasons. First, FLF take-up is fairly well-predicted by
the model, and second, FLF stores diﬀer from other retailers on observable dimensions.
For example, FLF stores are less likely to compete with a local Blockbuster outlet than
titles released during the year primarily because some stores may have started their FLF contract part-way
through the year.
26non-FLF stores (19% versus 27%). Non-FLF stores may therefore have adopted a strategy
of “breadth” rather than “depth” to diﬀerentiate themselves from their competition. FLF
stores are also disproportionately members of middle-sized chains: none are single-outlet
stores, and none are in the “large chain size” deﬁned in the inequalities analysis. Finally,
49% of non-FLF stores are in the bottom quartile of take-up for RS contracts in our data;
no FLF stores are in this bottom quartile. This may be indicative that non-FLF stores have
poor relations with Rentrak or some other friction that prompts them to choose LP contracts
when possible.
8 Conclusion
We study the decisions of distributors and retailers to adopt bundling (FLF) arrangements
within a supply-chain setting using data from the video rental industry. Our results indicate
that distributors are making optimal choices regarding whether to oﬀer FLF contracts. Those
that choose not to oﬀer these contract terms tend to be relatively strong players that are
producing popular titles during this period; they do not need to oﬀer more attractive terms
to persuade retailers to carry their movies. Of the two FLF distributors we analyze, one is
a less strong player during this period. The other is an intermediate player, for which FLF
take-up is proﬁtable only for some retailers, which diﬀer in observable ways from other retail
outlets.
Content providers make or lose money based on the quality of their content, which is
constantly refreshed in markets for information goods. Thus, an important advantage for
any study of bundling is the availability of detailed data on both the consumption of this
content, and the supply-side features of the market. Such data have often not been available
in markets for which bundling is an important contractual tool, although the potential for
gathering such data continues to improve, particularly in digital media markets.74 We observe
this type of detailed data in a market that pre-dates many of the current digital technologies,
but still retains many of the salient features of markets for information goods (e.g., low costs
of reproduction, and continual update of content). The empirical approach can serve as
a model for how to utilize detailed demand and supply data in order to understand the
decisions of ﬁrms to use bundling contracts, and the implications of their use for policy-
relevant questions.
74For example, many book publishers engage in various forms of bundling between print and electronic
books, and also track downloads directly. Similarly, music downloading services such as iTunes track con-
sumption behavior directly, and employ a variety of contractual arrangements with music labels that govern
distribution. As various markets for television shows and movies continue to become more digitalized, they
will also gain the ability to track consumption behavior at a more detailed level.
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29Table 1: Summary Statistics
Linear Revenue Full-Line Sell-Through
Contract Pricing Sharing Forcing Pricing
Avg. Upfront Cost 66.82 8.46 3.61 15.16
(5.62) (1.08) (1.21) (1.64)
Avg. Retailer’s Share of Revenue 100% 46.01% 59.02% 100%
(-) (3.03%) (1.99%) (-)
Avg. Minimum quantity - 10.40 10.96 -
(-) (11.70) (10.74) (-)
Avg. Maximum quantity - 23.63 22.84 -
(-) (22.74) (21.85) (-)
Avg No. of Rentals
Month 1: 53.90 68.11 53.87 95.92
(87.59) (101.59) (93.78) (135.27)
Month 2: 70.22 69.73 64.75 88.89
(99.70) (99.91) (87.92) (108.81)
Month 3: 41.95 34.76 34.61 41.87
(56.79) (48.47) (47.06) (50.51)
Month 4: 27.10 21.80 22.07 23.47
(35.00) (29.16) (29.49) (27.53)
Month 5+: 74.57 59.72 60.57 83.58
(113.75) (88.85) (89.01) (147.01)
Avg Rental Price
Month 1: 2.65 2.67 2.69 2.68
(0.57) (0.49) (0.60) (0.54)
Month 2: 2.82 2.77 2.88 2.86
(0.56) (0.50) (0.56) (0.59)
Month 3: 2.83 2.78 2.87 2.94
(0.61) (0.55) (0.64) (0.72)
Month 4: 2.83 2.78 2.87 2.95
(0.66) (0.60) (0.68) (0.83)
Month 5+: 2.80 2.69 2.89 2.96
(0.72) (0.67) (0.75) (0.88)
Avg Rentals per Tape
Month 1: 5.61 4.29 4.11 5.14
(4.39) (2.88) (3.14) (4.66)
Month 2: 7.72 4.76 5.54 5.22
(4.97) (3.20) (3.83) (3.70)
Month 3: 5.08 2.52 3.46 2.64
(3.82) (1.88) (2.90) (2.14)
Month 4: 3.58 1.66 2.50 1.64
(2.97) (1.33) (2.45) (1.67)
Month 5+: 13.59 5.05 7.34 6.91
(14.45) (4.97) (9.10) (8.95)
Avg Inventory 9.33 14.37 12.95 18.65
(14.92) (17.45) (18.05) (22.68)
Notes: Averages are across store-title pairs. Month 5+ is average for all months after month 4.
Standard deviations in parentheses.
30Table 2: Summary Statistics (Cont.)
Linear Revenue Full-Line Sell-Through
Contract Pricing Sharing Forcing Pricing
Total No. of Titles Released
by Distributors
Year 1: 219 115 0 27
Year 2: 204 125 10 24
Year 3: 231 132 18 21
Year 4: 209 113 38 26
Number of Stores 6,358 6,150 5,111 6,171
Avg No. of Titles Taken by Stores
Year 1: 99.72 23.74 - 20.41
(44.18) (24.83) - (6.78)
Year 2: 69.64 20.31 4.15 15.24
(45.03) (21.69) (3.15) (7.89)
Year 3: 98.98 18.61 6.29 14.70
(56.36) (23.28) (3.90) (6.77)
Year 4: 88.77 14.26 10.36 18.14
(40.12) (17.57) (7.26) (7.16)
Notes: Total number of titles oﬀered by distributors under each contract type and average number
of titles of each contract type taken by all active stores in each year. Standard deviations in
parentheses. Titles for distributors may be counted in more than one column. All Revenue-Sharing
and Full-Line Forcing titles are also oﬀered under Linear-Pricing contracts, although many titles are
oﬀered under LP terms only. No Sell-Through Pricing titles are oﬀered under alternate contracts.
31Table 3: Demand Results and Elasticity Estimates
OLS IV 1 IV 2
Coef (S.E.) Coef (S.E.) Coef (S.E.)
Price -0.027 (0.002) -0.026 (0.003) -0.024 (0.003)
Month 2 0.132 (0.023) 0.155 (0.024) 0.139 (0.025)
Month 3 -0.136 (0.022) -0.191 (0.025) -0.206 (0.025)
Month 4 -0.399 (0.023) -0.505 (0.025) -0.512 (0.026)
Month 5+ 0.190 (0.024) 0.276 (0.027) 0.283 (0.027)
Inventory 0.019 (0.0003) 0.021 (0.0004) 0.016 (0.0005)
Inv*Month 2 -0.003 (0.0004) -0.004 (0.0005) -0.003 (0.0005)
Inv*Month 3 -0.008 (0.0004) -0.009 (0.0005) -0.008 (0.0005)
Inv*Month 4 -0.012 (0.0004) -0.013 (0.0005) -0.013 (0.0005)
Inv*Month 5 -0.011 (0.0004) -0.013 (0.0005) -0.014 (0.0005)
σ 0.632 (0.0018) 0.498 (0.0030) 0.501 (0.0031)
N 407,006 407,006 407,006
R2 0.82 0.76 0.76
Month 1 Month 2 Month 3 Month 4 Month 5
All Box Oﬃce categories:
Price elasticity -0.127 -0.132 -0.139 -0.143 -0.129
Inventory elasticity 0.269 0.224 0.151 0.090 0.058
Box Oﬃce Category A:
Price elasticity -0.125 -0.132 -0.142 -0.148 -0.138
Inventory elasticity 0.521 0.437 0.294 0.176 0.123
Box Oﬃce Category B:
Price elasticity -0.125 -0.127 -0.136 -0.140 -0.128
Inventory elasticity 0.234 0.188 0.128 0.078 0.052
Box Oﬃce Category C:
Price elasticity -0.129 -0.135 -0.139 -0.141 -0.123
Inventory elasticity 0.106 0.089 0.059 0.035 0.022
Notes: In the top panel, IV1 results instrument for the within-group share only; IV2 instruments for
within-group share and inventory (region 1). All speciﬁcations include title and store ﬁxed eﬀects,
interactions between title ﬁxed eﬀects and store characteristics (the percent with kids, the percent
single and the percent white) and interactions between month ﬁxed eﬀects and title characteristics
(box oﬃce category, genre, rating and interactions of these variables). In the bottom panel, demand
elasticities with respect to price and inventory are calculated for every store-title-month observation
and then averages are taken within each zipcode region - month, and then across regions. 32Table 4: Inequalities Analysis Results
Speciﬁcation 1 Speciﬁcation 2 Speciﬁcation 3 Speciﬁcation 4
Coef 95% CI Coef 95% CI Coef 95% CI Coef 95% CI
Per Tape:
Constant 14.38** [13.10, -3.85** [-5.18, -2.66** [-2.98, -2.66** [-3.02,
15.48] -2.44] -2.39] -2.14]
Box B title 5.07** [4.26, 3.14** [1.18,
5.93] 5.46]
Box C title -7.97** [-8.36, -7.99** [-8.72,
-7.64] -7.51]
Medium Chain Size -5.30** [-6.75, -0.25 [-2.22,
-4.00] 1.74]
Large Chain Size -5.42** [-6.64, 1.01 [-0.73,
-4.24] 3.04]
Store tiers 4-6 -12.08** [-13.23, 0.17 [-1.14,
-10.72] 1.22]
Store tiers 7-10 -34.55** [-35.68, 2.12 [-1.82,
-33.41] 4.77]
Linear Pricing -35.80** [-36.25, 40.89** [33.42, 11.71** [7.21, 12.14** [7.31,
-35.42] 49.17] 16.35] 17.78]
LP*Box B title 2.65 [-0.19,
4.99]
LP*Box C title 0.04 [-0.67,
0.93]
LP*Medium Chain -53.92** [-62.57, -46.50** [-51.80, -46.47** [-52.90,
-46.33] -41.74] -41.63]
LP*Large Chain -61.14** [-70.00, -51.43** [-55.65, -51.38** [-57.31,
-53.43] -47.29] -47.07]
LP*Tiers 4-6 -16.17** [-17.98, 2.23** [0.24, 1.57 [-0.08,
-13.48] 4.41] 4.08]
LP*Tiers 7-10 -44.17** [-46.83, -6.00** [-8.06, -6.41** [-8.17,
-39.84] -3.66] -3.89]
Notes: In Table 4, coeﬃcients represent predicted costs to the store per tape. “Box B title” and
“Box C title” are indicators for titles in Box Oﬃce categories B and C: those with theatrical box
oﬃce revenues $15-40 million and under $15 million respectively. “Medium Chain Size” and “Large
Chain Size” are stores in chains containing 2-44 stores and 112-1652 stores respectively. Store tiers
rank stores by size, where 1 is smallest and 10 is largest. “Linear Pricing” is an indicator for
store-title pairs where the title is taken on a LP contract. **: signiﬁcant at p=0.05; *: signiﬁcant
at p=0.10.
33Table 5: Implications of Inequalities Analysis for Costs Per Tape, by Store
and Title Type
Retailer % of Box A titles Box B titles Box C titles
Characteristics stores LP titles RS titles LP titles RS titles LP titles RS titles
Chain Size: Tier Size:
Small 1-3 16.8% 9.48 -2.66 15.27 0.48 1.53 -10.65
4-6 3.9% 11.05 -2.66 16.84 0.48 3.10 -10.65
7-10 0.4% 3.07 -2.66 8.86 0.48 -4.88 -10.65
Medium 1-3 18.9% -36.99 -2.66 -31.20 0.48 -44.95 -10.65
4-6 16.2% -35.42 -2.66 -29.63 0.48 -43.38 -10.65
7-10 6.4% -43.40 -2.66 -37.61 0.48 -51.35 -10.65
Large 1-3 13.5% -41.90 -2.66 -36.11 0.48 -49.85 -10.65
4-6 18.1% -40.33 -2.66 -34.54 0.48 -48.28 -10.65
7-10 5.9% -48.30 -2.66 -42.51 0.48 -56.26 -10.65
Notes: Implications of the estimates in Table 4 for costs (in $ per tape) to each type of retailer of
each type of title. “Box B title” and “Box C title” are titles in Box Oﬃce categories B and C: those
with theatrical box oﬃce revenues $15-40 million and under $15 million respectively. “Medium
Chain Size” and “Large Chain Size” are stores in chains containing 2-44 stores and 112-1652 stores
respectively. Store tiers rank stores by size, where 1 is smallest and 10 is largest. “Linear Pricing”
is an indicator for store-title pairs where the title is taken on a LP contract. Positive numbers
represent positive costs to the store.
34Table 6: Average Predicted Retailer Choices of Titles by Contract Type
No. Model 1: All costs Model 2: No LP costs Model 3: 44% LP costs
of Focal studio titles Focal studio titles Focal studio titles
stores None/LP/RS/FLF None/LP/RS/FLF None/LP/RS/FLF
I. FLF studio 1
i. FLF stores
observed 294 1.3 / 4.2 / 0.9 / 11.6
model (no FLF) 4.1 / 11.1 / 2.8 / 0 4.1 / 11.1 / 2.8 / 0 4.1 / 11.1 / 2.8 / 0
model (with FLF) 4.0 / 10.9 / 2.6 / 0.4 1.8 / 4.9 / 1.1 / 10.3 2.3 / 6.4 / 1.4 / 7.9
ii. non-FLF stores
observed 1574 3.7 / 11.9 / 2.4 / 0
model (no FLF) 4.7 / 10.1 / 3.2 / 0 4.7 / 10.1 / 3.2 / 0 4.7 / 10.1 / 3.2 / 0
model (with FLF) 4.6 / 10.0 / 3.0 / 0.4 2.6 / 5.3 / 1.1 / 9.0 4.0 / 8.7 / 2.4 / 3.0
II. FLF studio 2
i. FLF stores
observed 2094 0.7 / 0 / 0.0 / 5.3
model (no FLF) 3.4 / 2.6 / 0.0 / 0 3.4 / 2.6 / 0.0 / 0 3.4 / 2.6 / 0.0 / 0
model (with FLF) 2.2 / 1.6 / 0.0 / 2.2 1.2 / 0.3 / 0.0 / 4.5 1.5 / 0.6 / 0.0 / 3.9
III. Non-FLF studio 1
observed 2316 6.6 / 10.0 / 4.4 / 0
model (no FLF) 5.4 / 13.8 / 1.8 / 0 5.4 / 13.8 / 1.8 / 0 5.4 / 13.8 / 1.8 / 0
model (with FLF) 5.2 / 13.2 / 1.6 / 1.0 1.4 / 2.9 / 0.3 / 16.5 3.0 / 6.6 / 0.7 / 10.7
IV. Non-FLF studio 2
observed 2316 1.2 / 6.9 / 1.9 / 0
model (no FLF) 3.9 / 5.6 / 0.5 / 0 3.9 / 5.6 / 0.5 / 0 3.9 / 5.6 / 0.5 / 0
model (with FLF) 3.7 / 5.4 / 0.5 / 0.5 1.8 / 1.6 / 0.2 / 6.3 2.8 / 3.4 / 0.4 / 3.4
V. Non-FLF studio 3
observed 2316 8.2 / 9.1 / 1.7 / 0
model (no FLF) 2.8 / 6.8 / 9.4 / 0 2.8 / 6.8 / 9.4 / 0 2.8 / 6.8 / 9.4 / 0
model (with FLF) 2.3 / 5.4 / 6.7 / 4.5 0.5 / 0.6 / 0.7 / 17.3 0.9 / 1.6 / 1.7 / 14.7
VI. Non-FLF studio 4
observed 2316 7.0 / 13.4 / 0.7 / 0
model (no FLF) 12.1 / 8.6 / 0.3 / 0 12.1 / 8.6 / 0.3 / 0 12.1 / 8.6 / 0.3 / 0
model (with FLF) 0.9 / 1.8 / 0.0 / 18.3 0.3 / 1.0 / 0.0 / 19.7 0.3 / 1.1 / 0.0 / 19.6
Notes: Predictions of the counterfactual analysis for average portfolio choices of retailers, by dis-
tributor. FLF studios 1 and 2 oﬀer FLF terms in the data; Non-FLF studios 1-4 do not. “Non-FLF
stores” do not take FLF terms from a FLF studio. “Observed” is observed portfolio choices; “model
(no FLF)” is the model’s prediction if FLF is not an option; “model (with FLF)” is the model’s
prediction if FLF is an option for the retailer.
35Table 7: Average Predicted Retailer and Distributor Profits
Mean store proﬁts Focal studio proﬁts Other studio proﬁts
per store (total) per store
I. FLF studio 1
i. FLF stores
model (no FLF option) $48,150 $5,888 $76,890
model (with FLF option) $48,620 $5,910 $76,760
ii. non-FLF stores
model (no FLF option) $52,070 $5,706 $73,360
model (with FLF option) $52,260 $5,354 $73,370
II. FLF studio 2
i. FLF stores
model (no FLF option) $58,990 $748 $98,510
model (with FLF option) $59,230 $945 $98,430
III. Non-FLF studio 1
model (no FLF option) $57,250 $7,981 $75,550
model (with FLF option) $58,100 $5,996 $75,560
IV. Non-FLF studio 2
model (no FLF option) $57,760 $6,472 $78,150
model (with FLF option) $58,120 $5,500 $78,200
V. Non-FLF studio 3
model (no FLF option) $56,830 $5,033 $82,330
model (with FLF option) $57,640 $3,151 $82,400
VI. Non-FLF studio 4
model (no FLF option) $57,400 $4,400 $79,330
model (with FLF option) $61,190 $954 $79,330
Notes: Predictions of simulations when 44% of the LP interaction terms in the moment inequalities
estimates are applied to retailers’ proﬁts. Column 1 reports mean store proﬁts, column 2 reports
average focal studio proﬁts per retailer and column 3 reports total non-focal studio proﬁts per
retailer (summed over all non-focal studios). For each focal studio the ﬁrst row reports the model’s
predictions when the option of taking FLF is not available. The second row reports predictions
when FLF is available.
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Summary Statistics, Demand Elasticities and Second-Stage Demand Regression
Additional Summary Statistics
In this appendix, we discuss preliminary evidence and patterns from the data. Tables 8 and
9 provide additional information to supplement that in Table 2 of the paper. The number of
titles released by distributors, and taken by stores, under diﬀerent contract types are broken
out by Box Oﬃce Group.
Table 10 provides information on the size distribution of stores choosing diﬀerent types of
contracts. We begin by calculating the percent of each store’s titles that are taken under
each contract type. We then break down this distribution into quintiles and report, in the
ﬁrst panel of Table 10, the average store size (tier) for each quintile. The results demonstrate
that stores that accept very few titles on LP contracts (the lowest quintile) are the small
stores - these stores take a relatively high proportion of their titles on RS contracts. The
stores that accept a high proportion of their titles on LP contracts are on average larger
stores. This is consistent with the adverse selection eﬀect noted above: large stores tend to
be located in high-demand markets and therefore expect high demand for their titles. LP
contracts are most proﬁtable for these stores. The pattern for FLF contracts is similar to
that for LP: larger stores are more likely to accept a high proportion of their titles on FLF
contracts.
The second panel of Table 10 looks at these patterns in more detail. For each quintile and
contract type, we examine the percent of stores in that quintile/contract type that are store
tiers 1-3 or store tiers 7-10. We normalize these percentages by the overall percent of stores
that are in those tier groups across all quintiles and contract types. Thus, the result of 1.59
for tier 1-3 under LP and Quintile 1 indicates that store tiers 1-3 (small stores) are relatively
over-represented in the ﬁrst quintile of LP contracts (a value greater than 1 indicates over-
representation, and a value less than 1 indicates under-representation). Overall, small stores
are over-represented in the ﬁrst, second, and third quintiles of LP contracts, the ﬁrst and
second quintile of FLF contracts and the third, fourth and ﬁfth quintiles of RS contracts.
The reverse pattern holds for large stores: these are over-represented in the fourth and ﬁfth
quintiles of LP and FLF contracts and in the ﬁrst and second quintiles of RS contracts.
However, similar to small stores, large stores are also over-represented in the ﬁrst quintile of
FLF contracts.
Demand Elasticities
The variation for inventory elasticities, as discussed in the paper, is displayed in Figure 1.
Second-Stage Demand Regression
Table 11 reports the results of a regression of the store-title quality levels estimated in the
nested logit on store and title characteristics. Our dependent variable is the estimated value
of
h
ˆ δj + ˆ γjzm + ˆ ηm + ˆ θt + ˆ βtxj + ˆ λtcjm
i
. Results for the ﬁrst region are reported here; those
for other regions are similar. The independent variables are title characteristics (quarter
37of release to video, box oﬃce category, genre, rating and interactions of these variables),
store characteristics (demographics of the market, the number of households in the market
and an indicator for markets where Blockbuster Video is active), interactions between ti-
tle and store characteristics and the same month dummies and interaction terms that are
included in the nested logit. The results are intuitive. Box oﬃce category A titles have
higher estimated quality than those in categories B and (particularly) C. Action/adventure
movies (the omitted genre category) and comedies have higher demand than other genres;
children’s movies, romances and science ﬁction movies have particularly low rental demand.
PG13 movies have higher demand than those with other ratings. Markets with a high per-
cent female consumers have high demand for video rentals; those with a high proportion of
family heads who are single mothers have particularly high demand and those with a high
proportion of family heads who are single without children have particularly low demand.
The Blockbuster dummy is positive and signiﬁcant, probably indicating that Blockbuster
chooses to enter high-demand markets.75
Figure 1: Inventory Elasticities Implied by Demand Estimates
Notes: Elasticities implied by the demand estimates. Corresponding data are given in Table
4. Elasticities with respect to inventory are calculated for every store-title-month observation
and then averages are taken within each zipcode region - month and then across regions.
75The coeﬃcient on the number of households is negative and signiﬁcant, implying that large markets where
Blockbuster is not located have low demand. The coeﬃcient on median income is negative and signiﬁcant:
wealthier markets have fewer movie rentals, perhaps because wealthy families choose more expensive leisure
activities.
38Table 8: Summary Statistics (Cont.)
Linear Revenue Full-Line Sell-Through
Contract Pricing Sharing Forcing Pricing
Total No. of Titles Released
by Distributors
Year 1: 219 115 0 27
A Titles: 30 12 0 15
B Titles: 36 17 0 6
C Titles: 153 86 0 6
Year 2: 204 125 10 24
A Titles: 32 23 1 14
B Titles: 42 29 2 6
C Titles: 130 73 7 4
Year 3: 231 132 18 21
A Titles: 43 29 4 15
B Titles: 44 29 3 1
C Titles: 144 74 11 5
Year 4: 209 113 38 26
A Titles: 36 20 9 16
B Titles: 50 19 5 3
C Titles: 123 74 24 7
Notes: Total number of titles released by distributors and oﬀered under each contract type. Titles
may be counted in more than one column. All Revenue-Sharing and Full-Line Forcing titles are
also oﬀered under Linear-Pricing contracts, although many titles are oﬀered under LP terms only.
No Sell-Through Pricing titles are oﬀered under alternate contracts.
39Table 9: Summary Statistics (Cont.)
Linear Revenue Full-Line Sell-Through
Contract Pricing Sharing Forcing Pricing
Number of Stores
6,358 6,150 5,111 6,171
Avg No. of Titles Taken by Stores
Year 1: 99.72 23.74 - 20.41
(44.18) (24.83) - (6.78)
A Titles: 19.99 4.98 - 12.07
(7.41) (3.54) - (4.04)
B Titles: 23.85 5.23 - 4.29
(9.54) (5.38) - (1.62)
C Titles: 55.89 13.52 - 4.05
(30.06) (17.01) - (1.65)
Year 2: 69.64 20.31 4.15 15.24
(45.03) (21.69) (3.15) (7.89)
A Titles: 14.53 7.11 0.63 8.96
(8.89) (6.12) (0.48) (4.38)
B Titles: 20.03 6.88 1.23 3.93
(11.90) (7.67) (0.85) (2.39)
C Titles: 35.08 6.32 2.29 2.35
(26.31) (9.20) (2.18) (1.58)
Year 3: 98.98 18.61 6.29 14.70
(56.36) (23.28) (3.90) (6.77)
A Titles: 23.83 7.36 1.58 11.42
(12.29) (7.28) (0.98) (5.16)
B Titles: 26.18 5.23 0.92 0.78
(13.66) (7.46) (0.66) (0.42)
C Titles: 48.97 6.02 3.79 2.50
(32.74) (9.85) (2.71) (1.47)
Year 4: 88.77 14.26 10.36 18.14
(40.12) (17.57) (7.26) (7.16)
A Titles: 20.35 5.69 3.37 12.49
(8.81) (5.35) (2.08) (4.94)
B Titles: 33.30 3.69 1.06 2.39
(13.08) (5.36) (0.97) (1.08)
C Titles: 35.12 4.88 5.92 3.26
(20.77) (7.73) (4.61) (1.50)
Notes: Average number of titles of each contract type taken by all active stores in each year.
Standard deviations in parentheses. 40Table 10: Summary Statistics (Cont.)
Linear Revenue Full-Line Sell-Through
Contract Pricing Sharing Forcing Pricing
Ave store tier
Quintile 1 2.70 4.99 3.79 5.54
Quintile 2 2.93 5.16 2.76 4.70
Quintile 3 3.55 3.51 4.28 4.00
Quintile 4 4.74 3.01 4.29 2.93
Quintile 5 5.47 2.71 4.28 2.21
Quintile % of quintile
1 Tier 1-3 1.58 0.43 1.12 0.50
Tier 7-10 0.53 1.60 1.42 3.07
2 Tier 1-3 1.42 0.40 1.48 0.55
Tier 7-10 0.31 1.60 0.28 1.25
3 Tier 1-3 1.14 1.21 0.71 0.81
Tier 7-10 0.74 0.84 0.81 0.45
4 Tier 1-3 0.48 1.39 0.83 1.40
Tier 7-10 1.06 0.43 1.24 0.14
5 Tier 1-3 0.37 1.57 0.86 1.75
Tier 7-10 2.36 0.54 1.26 0.08
Notes: Panel 1 breaks the percent of each store’s titles adopted under a particular type of contract
into quintiles and reports the average store tier in each quintile. Tiers are ranked from 1 to 10
where 10 is largest. Panel 2 reports the percent of stores in each quintile that are in store tiers 1-3
and 7-10 respectively. These percentages are normalized by the percent of all stores that are in the
relevant set of tiers. Numbers over 1 indicate that the store type is over-represented in the relevant
quintile.
41Table 11: Demand Results: Second Stage Regressions
OLS IV 1 IV 2
Coef (S.E.) Coef (S.E.) Coef (S.E.)
Release date:
Quarter 2 -0.008 (0.004) -0.012 (0.004) -0.015 (0.004)
Quarter 3 -0.119 (0.004) -0.120 (0.004) -0.124 (0.004)
Quarter 4 -0.029 (0.004) -0.040 (0.004) -0.042 (0.004)
Box Oﬃce:
B -0.755 (0.042) -0.685 (0.043) -0.724 (0.045)
C -1.363 (0.039) -1.278 (0.041) -1.317 (0.042)
Genre:
Child/Family -0.787 (0.051) -0.600 (0.052) -0.638 (0.051)
Comedy 0.172 (0.046) 0.265 (0.047) 0.250 (0.046)
Drama -0.135 (0.023) -0.069 (0.023) -0.096 (0.023)
Horror/Suspense -0.021 (0.031) -0.021 (0.033) -0.036 (0.034)
Romance -0.821 (0.045) -0.661 (0.046) -0.688 (0.046)
Science Fiction -0.721 (0.053) -0.549 (0.056) -0.530 (0.056)
Rating:
PG -0.021 (0.032) 0.027 (0.032) 0.044 (0.032)
PG13 0.052 (0.053) 0.171 (0.054) 0.198 (0.053)
R, NC17, NR -0.006 (0.059) 0.115 (0.060) 0.124 (0.060)
Market characteristics:
Median age 0.0073 (0.0006) 0.0084 (0.0006) 0.0067 (0.0006)
Median income -0.0113 (0.0002) -0.0114 (0.0002) -0.0118 (0.0002)
Number of households -0.0001 (3.4E-7) -0.0001 (3.5E-7) -0.0001 (3.6E-7)
Percent white -0.0295 (0.0004) -0.0289 (0.0004) -0.0306 (0.0005)
Percent black -0.0240 (0.0004) -0.0233 (0.0004) -0.0249 (0.0004)
Percent female 0.0163 (0.0020) 0.0128 (0.0020) 0.0209 (0.0021)
Percent single mother with kids 0.0063 (0.0013) 0.0064 (0.0013) 0.0079 (0.0014)
Percent single father with kids -0.2546 (0.0037) -0.2509 (0.0039) -0.2526 (0.0040)
Percent single male -0.3782 (0.0076) -0.3797 (0.0078) -0.3753 (0.0080)
Percent single female -0.0382 (0.0043) -0.0410 (0.0044) -0.0390 (0.0045)
Percent married with kids 0.0196 (0.0005) 0.0194 (0.0006) 0.0227 (0.0006)
Percent with Bachelor’s -0.0115 (0.0003) -0.0116 (0.0003) -0.0110 (0.0003)
Blockbuster in market 0.6703 (0.0035) 0.6707 (0.0036) 0.6743 (0.0037)
Percent rural 0.0006 (0.0002) 0.0004 (0.0002) 0.0008 (0.0002)
Percent suburban -0.0008 (0.0001) -0.0009 (0.0001) -0.0008 (0.0001)
N 407,006 407,006 407,006
R2 0.43 0.40 0.40
Notes: Regression of estimated quality (including title ﬁxed eﬀect-store characteristic interactions,
store ﬁxed eﬀects and all decay rate interactions) from nested logit on title and store characteristics.
IV1 instruments for the within-group share only. IV2 instruments for both within-group share and
inventory. Omitted category for Box is A; for Genre is Action/Adventure; for Rating is G. All
speciﬁcations include interactions between title and store characteristics and between month ﬁxed
eﬀects and title characteristics.
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